Introduction

Why would qualitative research make use of multidimensional scaling techniques? For, qualitative research resents the operationalisation and quantification of variables. This answer seems to be based on a number of beliefs about the quantification of qualitative variables, about the differences between qualitative and quantitative research and about the advantages of qualitative above quantitative research. The use of qualitative methods is not an open door to free association. It is a method of data collection and analyses which, as quantitative research, has to meet ethical and scientific demands. The criteria by which these demands are evaluated differ. Where bracketing also 'controls' the frame of reference for the one, inter-and intra rater reliability does that for the other. But both have to account for the credibility of the researcher. It is remarkable how easily a polarisation of both research methods result in the categorisation of 'qualitative' researchers as phenomenologists and existentialists and 'quantitative' researchers as positivists. As if the difference between the context of discovery and the context of justification is irrelevant. As if credibility is secured by theory. Credibility of a researcher is not situated in being a phenomologist or positivist but in how the study attempts to answer a research question and is subsequently conducted. The variety of exotic topics of 'qualitative studies' reflect the generation of different research questions. It does not, however, reflect the exclusive right of 'qualitative research' on explorative research and N=1 studies (Heiser, 1990). Nor does it reflect the exemption of 'qualitative' researchers to be grounded in 'quantitative' data analyses. The increase in qualitative research might be explained by the shift in the research tradition in South Africa (Kruijsse, 1996a). The results of studies (Visser and van Staden, 1990; Huysamen, 1996) and discussions (HSRC, 1996) about methodology, however, suggest that the preference in qualitative research might also be explained by deficiency. These studies and discussions show a dominance of basic statistics in psychological research in South Africa, how multi-variate designs are treated as bi-variate designs (Kruijsse, 1996a) and the need for better training in methodology. The aim of this article is to show that the difference between 'qualitative' and quantitative research is less dogmatic than it seems to be. Particularly from a pragmatic angle: the angle of research. It will be argued that, 'qualitative' research might be improved by being familiar with techniques such as PRINCALS (Gifi, 1985, 1990).

Conceptualisation

Although some might claim that phenomenologists oppose the stage of conceptualisation as being a threat against biases, nuancing seems necessary. Research never starts from scratch. The researcher's perceptions are reflected in the generation of a research question and categories irrespective of the level of formalisation of the researcher's frame of reference. Since conceptualisation inherently implies the formalisation of the researchers' knowledge, perspectives and beliefs, credibility is 'controlled'. In the course of becoming familiar with the subjects experiences, the researcher's perceptions might and are supposed to be changed. But the proneness to representatives and availability heuristics, to confirmation bias and bounded rationality cannot be neglected even if we are scientists. Cognisance of studies therefore improves insight into these experiences (Moore and Shantall, 1996). Evidently, the difference between 'qualitative' and quantitative research is not defined by the stage of conceptualisation.

Numeric and non numeric

Neither is the difference between 'qualitative' and quantitative research defined by the the difference between qualitative and quantitative variables. The latter ones are 'natural' variables which generate numerics e.g. the length of a person. Ethnic background is an example of a qualitative variable. The level in which you feel comfortable in a crowded Taxi van is also a qualitative variable. It is ridiculous to suggest that you would feel twice as comfortable on a bicycle. But it makes sense when you would say that you feel more comfortable on a bicycle than in a Taxi van. That you are more confident when you drive instead of being driven. Although these variables are not numeric they contain more information than for example ethnicity; a categorical variable. There is a certain order defined by 'more comfort' which lacks a categorical variable. The question how to label these variables is irrelevant as long as the properties of these variables remain unaffected. Thus, a 'numeric' value is nothing more then a label. The point of this exercise is that the difference between 'qualitative' and quantitative research is not the numeric labelling of items. The use of word processors and more sophisticated applications to analyse 'qualitative' data proves that point (Payze, 1996).

The treatment of variables

A fundamental aspect of techniques of data-analyses lay in the treatment of the variables. Categorical variables should be treated as nominal. Variables which can be ordered can be treated as nominal or ordinal. Treating an ordinal variable as an interval variable is a violation of the property of that variable. Feeling 'more comfortable' is an ordinal variable. The expression 'more' is almost intuitively associated with volume or distance. In fact, it seems very logical to represent 'travelling by train' close to 'travelling by Taxi' but far from 'travelling with a bicycle and moped' on the dimension of control. The transformation of ordinal variables into distances, however, is conditional: the transformation should be invariant. Thus closeness is relative rather then absolute. The principle of invariant transformation underlie the optimal scaling of variables (Young, 1981). Whether the data already consist of qualitative variables summarised into categorical judgements or rankorders, or whether the data is thematised and itemised, an optimal relationship between variables (or subjects) can be explored in the search for underlying constructs. An example of how this is established will be given below. As for the difference between 'qualitative' and quantitative research, the quantification variables with the restriction of invariant transformation is not a determinant. Moreover, the term qualitative research seems rather inadequate since most of the research in the psychological field uses qualitative variables.

Operationalisation

The difference seems to be reflected by how variables are conceptualised rather then the properties of the variables. Variables can be regarded as a set of operandi to measure a psychological construct. By defining qualitative variables a formal relationship between these variables and the conceptualisation of the phenomenon to be studied is assumed. This relationship is based on what is known about that phenomenon through literature. The less a formal relationship is defined the more explorative the research will be. This does not imply the abolition of conceptualisation. But it does imply a rejection of operationalisation. Generating categories from the research data itself versus defining categories prior to the data collection might represent two different philosophical schools. But on the level of data collection and analysis it is rather a one dimensional representation of two extremes.

Optimal scaling

To illustrate how it is possible to optimally scale qualitative data a somewhat adapted and simplified example about constructing a map of South Africa is given. The restriction is that no assumptions are made about a relationship between 'answer-categories' other than that they are nominally different. Suppose, you mentioned that Jo-Burg is closer to Durban than Port Elisabeth is to Cape Town. And I asked you whether Jo-Burg is closer to Port Elisabeth than Durban is to Cape Town. When you said yes, you added that Johannesburg is further from Cape Town then Port Elisabeth is from Durban. So far we could represent these distances without too much difficulty. But it becomes more complicated when I compare all the possible alternatives. So I drew a circle with Jo-Burg at random somewhere inside of it and PE randomly outside of it. I drew a second circle of the same scale with Cape Town somewhere inside of it and Durban outside of it. With the restriction, however, that the distance between Durban and Cape Town should be longer than Jo-Burg and PE. I then continued asking whether Cape Town is closer to Durban than Jo-burg is to Durban and I was forced to rotate my circles relative to each other.

Clearly, by exploring the possible combinations over more cities I would be able to draw a map. I will not be able to draw a map with the exact distances. But I will know there relative distances to each other. I shall have to deal with intransitive situations like A is close to B, B close to C but C is not close to A. But in the end I shall be able to define positions of the cities; not perfectly and not in exact distances, but relative to each other. Thus, the less inconsistencies the less effort (stress) it will take me to map the cities accurately. If I would ask more subjects, the probability of inconsistencies might increase even to such an extent that a third dimension is necessary to keep the stress low. However, a third dimension will not be accurate unless a subject referred to time travel instead of a straight line between cities.

PRINCALS

In analogy with the example, PRINCALS is able to map psychological data. PRINCALS is a combination of PRINcipal component analysis and Alternating Last Squares. PRINCALS' most important criterion is minimising stress. It rearranges the categories of the variables such that an optimal transformation is found. Transformations, however, are restricted to the level of scale measurement. The relationship between the transformed variables is given by projecting these variables into a more dimensional space. Analogous with Principal Component Analysis (PCA), the dimensions represent latent (transformed) factors underlying the data. The number of dimensions are optional but as explained in the example above, a limited amount of dimensions are attractive. PRINCALS is supported by SPSS (Statistical Package of Social Sciences) and generates the following output.

Eigenvalues

The Eigenvalue is the fit per dimension. It indicates how successful PRINCALS was in fitting the transformed items into one or more dimensions. The Eigenvalue is the mean of the squared component loading and explains the variance of the transformed items. The most common criteria to decide the number of eigenvalues are: 1. A dimension should explain at least more variance (standardised) than the variance of a single variable. For, there is no benefit to assume a dimension if it explains less then the variance of its items Thus, the minimum Eigenvalue should be more then 'one'. 2. The elbow criterion selects the number of eigenvalues when the eigenvalues are graphically represented as a function of the order of the dimensions. Eigenvalues above the elbow are considered as relevant. 3. The third criterion refers to the ability of interpretation. For example, when a third dimension might meet the first criterion but is hard to interpret, a two-dimensional representation might be beneficial. The next step in the analysis is to investigate the component loadings.

Objectscores

In most of the cases the matrix is constructed such that the columns represent the variables, the rows represent the subjects (cases) and the cells contain the categories (responses). An objectscore is a summary of the responses on the variables of one subject. Since a dimension represent an underlying construct objectscores are calculated per dimension. Objectscores can be used for further analyses by different techniques.

Component loadings and Fit

Component Loadings contain essential information to interpret the relationship between the variables and the labelling of the two dimensions of our example. It is the correlation between a variable and a dimension. Thus, a dimension can be labelled by identifying variables which correlate highly with the dimension. The squared Component Loading of a variable indicates the contribution of that variable in defining the dimension. It is called the Fit or discriminate value of a variable. The sum of the Fit of one variable is the total proportion of variance accounted for by that variable. Compared to PCA it represents the communality of a variable. Thus, on the basis of the squared Component Loading the level in which a transformed variable discriminates, can be identified. Once the main underlying constructs in the data are identified, the relationship between the variables can be evaluated. Since component loadings are the coordinates of a multi-dimensional space the variables can be plotted as the map of South Africa. The relative distance between the variables represent their relationship. It is furthermore easy to identify variables which group together.

Category quantification

To explain category quantification the example about travelling will be used. Although it might be clear that 'travelling with a Taxi' is closely related to 'travelling with the train' it is not clear how both are related. It might very well be that travelling by train is considered as (relatively) more comfortable than by Taxi. Suppose that 'comfort' was rated on a five point scale. Then category one of 'travelling with a Taxi' might be localised close to category two and three of 'travelling with the train'. As component loadings, the category quantifications are plotted by SPSS. For an elaborate discussion see Kruijsse, 1996b.

Summary

The difference between 'qualitative' and quantitative research is less dogmatic is it seems. The stage of conceptualisation as well as the stage of analyses of qualitative variables are not the determinants of the difference. When taken into account the difference between the context of discovery versus the context of justification, the difference is neither determined by data collection. Unstructured data collection is not uniquely linked to 'qualitative' research. The difference between 'qualitative' and quantitative research seems to be the way in which a relationship is formalised between variables and a psychological construct in the stage of conceptualisation. It was argued that the difference between 'qualitative' and quantitative research on the level of data collection and analysis is rather a one dimensional representation of two extremes. It was explained how qualitative variables can be analysed by PRINCALS. A categorical and multi-dimensional scaling technique which transforms the variables such that underlying constructs are identified and an optimal relationship between the variables is found. Although PRINCALS generate an output similar to factor analysis, it's ability to deal with variables of different scale measurement, it's powerful graphical representation and it's explorative property which gives room for non-rigid interpretations, makes PRINCALS suitable for logical analyses of qualitative data.

References

Gifi, A. (1985). PRINCALS. Departement of Data Theory, Leiden University. UG-85-03.

Gifi, A. (1990). Nonlinear multivariate analysis. Chicester: Wiley.

Heiser, W.J. (1990). Q-methodology revised: Multidimensional Scaling of Intra -and Interindividual Differences. 22nd Int. Congress of Applied Psychology, Kyoto, Japan.

HSRC, (1996). Discussion on issues of methodology and training. 11 april, HSRC, CSD.

Huysamen, G.K. (1996). Some methodological issues in health psychology research. South African Journal of Psychology, 26 (1), 10-15.

Kruijsse, H.W. (1996a). To measure is to know, but do we know what to measure? Presented at the PSYSA, September, 1996.

Kruijsse, H.W. (1996b). How to map a reality: Why PRINCALS to analyse qualitative data? In Press.

Moore C., Shantall, T. (1996) Qualitative Research: A body divided by itself? Presented at the 2nd. Annual South African Qualitative Methods Conference at the University of Witwatersrand, September '96.

Payze, C. (1996). An overvieuw of computer aided qualitative data analysis techniques. Presented at the 2nd. Annual South African Qualitative Methods Conference at the University of Witwatersrand, September, 1996.

Staden van, F. and Visser D. (1989). Analysis of themes and statistical techniques: A review of the past decade of the South African Journal of Psychology. South African Journal of Psychology, 20 (2), 47-55.

Young, F.W. (1981). Quatitative Analysis of Qualitative Data. Psychometrika, vol.46, no. 4. pp. 357-388.

[email protected]

Department of Psychology

Stellenbosch University

Private Bag X1

7602 Matieland

In my own work I have found it useful to place any research question paradigmatically before developing an appropriate design for the project meant to answer the research question. Smaling (1994a:234) concisely defines a paradigm as follows:

"In the relevant literature a paradigm is conceived as a constellation of beliefs, norms, and values which guides scientific action."

Various paradigmatic conceptualizations exist. For example, Smaling (1994a; 1994b) distinguishes three different research paradigms, namely the empirical-analytical, the interpretive and the critical paradigms. On the other hand, Cook & Reichardt (1979) distinguish between two paradigms namely the qualitative and quantitative paradigms, while Guba and Lincoln (1988) distinguish between the conventional paradigm and the alternative paradigm. However, I find Smaling's (1994a:234; 1994b) conceptualization of the different paradigms to be most comprehensive from the perspective of the philosophy of social science research, and therefore, align myself with it.

Smaling (1994a:233; 1994b) describes the empirical-analytical paradigm, the interpretive paradigm and the critical paradigm. He argues that these paradigms are often distinguished from each other on several philosophical levels, namely those of ontology, epistemology, axiology, meta-theory and methodology. However, these distinctions do not make the paradigms mutually exclusive nor do they necessarily place them in opposition to each other. I therefore use the distinctions here only for the purposes of placing myself in the debate. In this paper I will focus only on the methodological level as it has bearing on qualitative data analysis.

The methodological level is of particular importance in the design of any social sciences research project. Speake (1979:230) defines methodology in the following manner:

"The study of method, usually covering the procedures and aims of a particular discipline, and enquiry into the way in which that discipline is organized."

For the purposes of social sciences research, attention needs to be given specifically to those norms which govern the measures of scientificity in research, and notably to the conceptualization of objectivity, validity and reliability. According to Smaling (1992b: 171), objectivity is equated with regimentation (for example in the standardization of tests), consensus (for example intersubjective testability such as in the work of Popper (1968) or interobserver agreement such as in the work of Kerlinger (1970)), or intersubjective controllability ("to be as explicit as possible about the used materials, methods, and designs and the arguments used for the selection of particular data, concepts, methods, designs, interpretations, explanations and theories") within the empirical-analytical paradigm. The interpretive paradigm holds a conceptualization of subjectivity (utilizing the trained subjective qualities of the researcher as an aid rather than a hazard). Finally, the critical paradigm conceptualizes objectivity as an orientation towards historical emancipatory tendencies (Smaling, 1994b).

Two other norms of particular importance in governing social sciences research are those of reliability and validity, the applied meaning of which vary according to paradigm. I argue here not only that the application of these methodological norms is essential in the production of scientific knowledge, but also that an understanding of their different meanings in terms of application across the three paradigms is a crucial prerequisite for being able to do or evaluate research projects effectively. Smaling (1992a:309) defines reliability in the following manner:

"Reliability is a methodological requirement that can be imposed on procedures (such as observations, techniques, methods, (measuring) instruments, research processes (and frameworks) and on the results of research studies (such as collected data, interim and final conclusions and assessments). The core meaning of methodological reliability is the absence of random errors. These are errors that distort the object of study and for which no definite regularity or system is assumed."

He then continues to describe the criteria for enhancing reliability (1992a: 313):

"In qualitative research various measures can be taken to enhance reliability. As far as internal reliability is concerned, the following measures exist: triangulation..., peer examination (checking with fellow researchers ...), member checks (submitting inconsistencies between research findings to the persons studied ...), reasoned consensus (achievement of agreement between project participants on the basis of open discussion based on arguments), selection and training of fellow researchers, observers, interviewers, encoders etc.), audit trail (independent auditors examine everything ...), ... automation of aspects of data processing and analysis. As far as external reliability ... is concerned, two steps are necessary: Description and explication. This involves precise description (thick description) of: the status and the role that the researcher had in the eyes of the research subjects, the relevant characteristics of the selected subjects ... the concepts used, theoretical ideas and research methods, etc".

Furthermore validity is defined by Smaling (1992a:314) as: "Validity is a methodological requirement for procedures (such as observations, techniques, methods, (measuring) instruments, research processes and frameworks) and research results (such as collected data, assessments, interim and final conclusions of the analysis). An important meaning of validity is the absence of random and systematic errors... This not uncommon conception of validity leads to the result that, logically speaking, complete reliability is in fact possible without validity in a sense other than that of reliability, but that complete validity is not possible without reliability. Besides this negative formulation of validity (absence of errors) a positive formulation is also frequently used: agreement between procedures and results on the one hand and the 'intended' object of study on the other hand. These two formulations are far from synonymous: in research practice for example the one-sided emphasis on the avoidance of errors can in fact hamper the finding of fresh, surprising insights".

Smaling (1992a: 314) also distinguishes between various forms of validity, namely internal validity (validity within a research project, including content validity, concept validity and logical validity); and external validity (the meaning of the study for those persons, situations, etc. who were not involved, including generalizability and transferential validity).

Three types of internal validity are distinguished. Content validity refers mainly to the validity of the instruments used, for example the questionnaires or interview schedules. Concept validity refers to procedures such as the appropriate completion of the questionnaire. Logical validity refers to the degree to which the research project is defendable in terms of its design, and also the results obtained from within the particular design.

Two types of external validity are distinguished. Generalizability refers to the degree to which the results of the study can be applied to populations other than the one which was studied, while transferential validity refers to the utilization by others of some of the findings, rather than an across the board generalization to another population.

According to Smaling (1992a:318):

"Content or substantive validity can be ensured in qualitative research by preparing a comprehensive register of data, notes of relevant events and the state of affairs, and theoretical and methodological memoranda and by regularly studying these notes and memoranda ... During the analysis process a period can be set aside in which data are arranged and interpreted without making use of special knowledge of the literature ... For both content and concept validity it is very helpful to use member checks, peer debriefing and audit trail ... In qualitative research ... logical validity is dependent on the logic of the research framework ... (T)heory-driven data collection yields a great variety in the data, the external validity is thereby enhanced ... As far as transferential validity is concerned, a requirement is that the research report should firstly contain an accurate description of the research process, and secondly an explication of the arguments for the different choices of the method etc., and thirdly a detailed description (thick description) of the research situation and context ..."

Given the above I argue that objectivity in qualitative research can be enhanced by the use of computers in certain instances by adhering to the principles of intersubjective controllability. Furthermore, reliability can be enhanced by the use of computers during the qualitative data analysis phase by aiding researcher triangulation (technically projects can be e-mailed or sent via disk from researcher to researcher, while two researchers in the same city can share their combined data analysis efforts via one computer or network); method triangulation (if computer analysis is combined with analysis by hand); peer examination (it may be easier to show one's work to another researcher who is also acquainted with the same software package than to share one's notes from the filing cabinet); and audit trial (technically, depending on the size of the project, this may make the work of checking the data analysis easier for independent researchers). Of course, automated processing and analysis is itself stated by Smaling to be useful in enhancing reliability in qualitative research. As far as validity is concerned, the use of computers may help with keeping extensive notes and memoranda, as well as the use of memos in theory driven data collection.

However, having said this, it should be borne in mind that not all packages are capable of doing all of the above and that probably only one or two can do them all. This means that the existing software for qualitative data analysis often does no more than aid one in the management of large volumes of data and may indeed not be worth investing in for other reasons. I will now briefly look at the packages on the market as described and indexed by Weitzman & Miles (1995).

Weitzman & Miles classify the 24 software packages for qualitative data analysis which they reviewed into five categories, namely text retrievers, textbase managers, code-and retrieve programs, code-based theory-builders, and conceptual network builders. These will now be briefly discussed.

Weitzman & Miles (1995:27) describe text retrievers as follows: They "are basically good at hunting for words, phrases, or other 'strings' of characters in your database, and then bringing them to you for your scrutiny, either one at a time and/or collected in a batch. They may range considerably in details of how you give them a search request and how you search 'hits' look when you get them. Some can do frequency distributions or crosstabs of your hits as well." Bearing in mind the goal of enhanced validity, reliability and objectivity, I find these packages of fairly limited use. However, some e.g. Metamorph are rated highly in terms of their purpose. Furthermore these packages have the added advantage of being fairly easy to learn and use.

The next category which Weitzman & Miles (1995:98) review are textbase managers. These are described as follows: Textbase managers "are related to the 'text retriever' family, but with some added functions. They keep your data in a systematic, ordered fashion - whether that involves 'records' and 'fields', free form text, or even quantitative information linked to text. They help you manage complex databases, and can sort or segment them into meaningful subsets to help you make comparisons and contrasts. They're also good at search and retrieval." Personally, I find these more helpful than text retrievers in terms of rigorous data analysis, especially when faced with large volumes of data. They may also be a good choice of software if one does not require complex searching, indexing, memoing or hypertext functions, since packages such as Folio VIEWS or askSam are quite useful all purpose database managers.

Weitzman & Miles (1995: 148) describe code-and retrieve programs as follows: These programs "assume that you want to 'code' your data - that is apply keywords to meaningful segments or 'chunks', such as lines, sentences or paragraphs of your text. They help you to set up the kind of 'chunks' you want to use, to develop a list of codes, to attach the right codes to the right chunks - and then to search for and retrieve all the chunks to which one or several codes have been applied." These programs are fairly well known and widely used. They include the Ethnograph, Kwalitan, HyperQual2, QUALPRO, and Martin. While WinMax was not reviewed by Weitzman & Miles, my guess would be that it fits here as well. A large advantage of these packages is that they are usually easy to learn and use and that they actually make the process of labouring through hundreds of pages of data less tedious, time consuming and intimidating. However, although they are more specifically dedicated to qualitative data analysis than textbase managers, they also do not allow for the more advanced functions contained in the code-based theory-builders.

Code-based theory-builders are in my opinion the most complex and advanced packages on the market for qualitative data analysis and are described by Weitzman & Miles (1995:204): "They too (except for one program, QCA) can do code-and-retrieve operations effectively, but they have structures and functions that provide assistance in building and testing theory as well. They help you to develop categories and outlines, extending your coding scheme; to annotate your data, write memos and link these to your codes; to formulate and test propositions or hypothesis; and sometimes to see graphical representations of the relationships among your concepts. They're often organized around a formal system of rules or logic." Because of the myriad of functions in packages such as ATLAS/ti or NUD.IST I argue here that these can indeed contribute a great deal to the enhancement of objectivity, reliability and validity in qualitative research, provided that the project is large enough to warrant the use of software during the data analysis phase, or that the researcher is already familiar with the software. A package like ATLAS/ti is particularly useful since it also contains some of the functions contained in conceptual network-builders. The largest problem with these packages is the amount of time that needs to be invested in learning the program, especially in a country like South Africa where the majority of the population, including many in the scientific community, is completely computer illiterate. This problem is partially addressed by mailing list for support such as those run by the developers of ATLAS/ti or NUD.IST, which provide fairly quick responses to those in need, provided they have access to, and are familiar with the internet. There are sometimes also local distributers for programs (e.g. ATLAS/ti or askSam in South Africa) which may be able to assist users for the price of a phone call to the Gauteng area.

Finally, Weitzman & Miles (1995:266) review conceptual network-builders: This software "also helps you build and test theory, using semantically meaningful networks. The networks contain 'nodes' (representing your key variables) and 'links' (representing the relationships among the variables). These are not just programs for drawing or diagramming. They base their graphic displays on your concepts, your thinking about your data, and your higher level propositions - and facilitate your ongoing conceptual work. Of these Inspiration and MetaDesign seem to be the most popular, often used in conjunction with NUD.IST which does not contain any form of relational links beyond its original indexing format.

In conclusion, when looking at the use of computer software for qualitative data analysis, I argue here that the norms of objectivity, reliability and validity should be the biggest consideration. However, practical issues also need to be evaluated. Qualitative data analysis software may be of no value to the research project if it will require vast amounts of project funding to install (especially when hardware needs to be upgraded first) and learn. Furthermore, the size of the project may not warrant such an expense. Also, and perhaps most important of all, qualitative researchers have been producing rigorous, valuable, useful research results without the aid of computers for many years. While the current trend to analyse with the aid of computers may enhance the degree certain methodological norms are adhered to, this in itself does not negate the scientific value of what has been done without computers. And finally, just as quantitative data analysis via computer is open to abuse, so is qualitative data analysis using computers - More and more projects are claiming to use some or other form of computerised qualitative data analysis as a means to improve the scientific value of their findings, while their designs remain weak or inappropriate - software for qualitative data analysis is not a magic wand which can hide or eradicate the flaws inevitably present in any project, it can merely aid the rigorous and honest researcher to better manage vast amounts of data in ways which can best do justice to the project.

References

Cook, T.D. & Reichardt, C.S. (1979). Beyond qualitative versus quantitative methods. In T.D. Cook & C.S. Reichardt (Eds). Qualitative and quantitative methods in evaluation research. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Guba, E.G. & Lincoln, Y. (1988). Do inquiry paradigms imply inquiry methodologies? In. D.M. Fetterman (Ed). Qualitative approaches to evaluation in education. New York: Praeger, pp. 89-115.

Kerlinger, F.N. (1970). Foundations of behavioural research. London: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Smaling, A. (1992a). Objectivity, reliability and validity. In G.J.N. Bruinsma & M.A. Zwanenburg (Eds). Methodology for management specialists: Trends and methods. Muiderberg: Dick Coutinho.

Smaling, A. (1992b). Varieties of methodological intersubjectivity - the relations with qualitative and quantitative research, and with objectivity. Quality and Quantity. 26, 169-180.

Smaling, A. (1994a). The pragmatic dimension: Paradigmatic and pragmatic aspects of choosing a qualitative or quantitative method. Quality and Quantity. 28, 233-249.

Smaling, A. (1994b). Series of lectures presented to the Centre for Research Methodology Winter School, Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria, July. (Unpublished).

Speake, J. (Ed). (1979). A dictionary of philosophy. London: Pan Books.

Weitzman, E.A. & Miles, M.B. (1995). Computer programs for qualitative data analysis. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Biographical note:

Catharine Payze completed a BA degree at the University of Pretoria in 1989 and a BA (Hons) degree in Psychology at the University of South Africa in 1992. She is currently in the process of completing a MA (Research Psychology) at the University of South Africa. She is also a member of the Psychological Society of South Africa. She began her career at the Human Sciences Research Council in 1990, where she received extensive hands-on training, notably in qualitative research methodology, and was involved in several research projects, mostly on the subject of political violence. Furthermore, she conducted several workshops on qualitative research methods including qualitative interviewing techniques and qualitative data analysis. She left the HRSC in 1995 to pursue the interests of her own business, ARK Research cc, where she continued to conduct training in qualitative research methods as well as computer aided qualitative data analysis. She currently lectures in the Department of Psychology at the University of South Africa. She has, together with some colleagues, produced a book and several chapters in books. She has also published some articles for the more popular press and delivered several conference papers.

[email protected]

Department of Psychology

University of South Africa

PO Box 392

Pretoria

0003

Sociologists and other social researchers have often wrestled with the implications of qualitative research: what is it? How is it untraditional? How can it be feminist? What are the ethical issues involved? These questions face every investigator who uses interviews, life histories, ethnographies, and other text-based ways of gathering data. A researcher in Africa, however, particularly a white researcher of Southern Africa like myself, must also face additional complications and puzzles about how to generate good and politically sensitive qualitative research.

Some of these issues facing the sociologist of Africa are general, dealing with debates over what exactly constitutes qualitative research, if particular epistemologies dictate particular methodologies, and what is the role of the sociologist in the "real world". Other research issues deal more specifically with the context of southern Africa: one of these is the question of who can know whom, specifically pondering if white, degreed researchers are "qualified" to speak for or about Black Africans. Related to this are issues of authorship: who gives and who takes knowledge in a research exchange, and how is this influenced by the strange dynamics of a vastly unequal, post-apartheid society?

What is qualitative research?

A primary obstacle to the discussion of this question is the lack of agreement among social scientists about what constitutes a qualitative perspective. The greatest inconsistency lies between researchers that define qualitative-ness in terms of methods -- the use of text, interviews, ethnographies, etc. -- and those that associate the word "qualitative" with an inductive (as opposed to deductive) style of generating hypotheses and theories. An instinctive criteria for most readers, that qualitative is word-based while quantitative is number-based data, holds for most sociologist's definitions; the dilemma arises in determining if this gathering of a particular style of data necessarily implies an inductive research process, and if this inductive process is synonymous with "feminist".

This debate is well illustrated by Bozzoli (1985; 1990; 1991), a South African researcher, and Risman (1993) who argue that methodologies and epistemologies don't determine each other. In contrast, Ribbens and Edwards (1995) and Kasper (1994) believe that they do. Risman (1993) offers a good starting point for this debate with her distinction between "feminist empiricism" and "feminist standpoint theory".

Risman writes that a feminist research perspective can be utilized with both quantitative/deductive methods (tacitly linked in her analysis) and qualitative/inductive methods, and that both are equally valid ways of conducting research. "Feminist empiricism" is the use of traditional methods to research feminist-oriented projects, while "standpoint theory" is a different type of work that emphasizes subjective understanding. Both of these approaches, she argues, can be used for feminist and non-feminist ends, and choosing one or the other does not determine the work's political content.

Risman disagrees with the argument, espoused by Ribbens and Edwards (1995) that qualitative/inductive methods are inherently less patriarchal and therefore more useful for the study of women. Risman believes that qualitative theory and methods are constructed in a patriarchal context just as much as qualitative methods, having arisen out of the same academic disciplines, so that one does not necessarily have a political superiority over the other (1993: 19).

Bozzoli (1985; 1990; 1991) would agree with this equal valuation of qualitative and quantitative methods for feminist studies, but would disagree with Risman that certain epistemologies and methodologies are linked. While her research in South Africa favors interview and life history data, she is deductive and traditional in the development of theories, following a more conventional Marxist notion of the process of good "science".

In contrast, Ribbens and Edwards (1995) emphasize more fundamental differences between qualitative/ inductive and quantitative/ deductive work (as with Risman, the two research components are linked in their analysis). In describing the nature of feminist research on women, Ribbens and Edwards posit that the style of the inductive, unstructured interview is a better way to get at "hidden" knowledge, which they would consider most of women's experiences to be. They describe the study of women's lives as the study of "everyday process", and that only through certain epistemological and methodological techniques can the researcher discover these "private ways of being" (1995: 252).

I disagree with these ideas on two fronts. The first is the resurrection of the "public-private" distinction, long a problem for social scientists of gender. It seems strange to me that in 1995 Ribbens and Edwards write about "the private sphere holding a particular meaning in relation to women's lives within domestic settings in industrialized Western societies" (1995: 251). The consensus of many sociologists is that the distinction between the public/male world and the private/female world was a Victorian creation, and one that does not accurately reflect the ways that most women spend their time in work and leisure, and indeed, even in the nineteenth century only reflected the lifestyles of the tiny upper class.

Ribbens and Edwards seem to believe that women's social world is fundamentally different from that of men, and that conventional research methods only measure phenomenon in the latter. While it is undoubtedly true that male biases exist in social science in everything from topic choice to study participants, the setting aside of certain methodologies as "suitable" for women seems to only reinforce this segregation.

If conventional methods and perspectives supposedly don't work for the feminist study of women, couldn't this also be taken to support the idea that traditional "science" is strictly a male sphere? If the study of women requires different and special research methods, could this reinforce the notion that women are not "scientific" or suitable subjects of science? While I agree with the overall goal of diversifying research perspectives to uncover aspects of women's lives that have been overlooked by traditional projects, I would disagree with Ribbens and Edwards' characterization that subjective, inductive styles are the only way to learn about women in a feminist manner.

The question remains of how these debates -- perpetually unresolved as they are -- can provide insight for the individual researcher. While I tend to be epistemologically traditional, favoring the deductive approach of classic "science", I would agree with Bozzoli that both quantitative and qualitative methods can be used in this format. Interviews, ethnographies, and life histories can be data in a traditional hypothesis-testing research project.

On the other hand, I would perhaps agree partially with Ribbens and Edwards that this classic deductive approach may not be the best for certain aspects of respondent's lives, particularly women, whose experiences may be cut off from traditional avenues and languages of "science". Where I would disagree with them, however, is in the notion that these studies of private, hidden, and domestic life are by definition female. I would advocate that both male and female study participants have social lives that are public and private, and each aspect can be accessed through appropriate ways of study.

Authorship, authority, and race

When a researcher attempts a qualitative project, one that incorporates subjective, open-ended, and narrative-based information, they inevitably run into questions of authorship. In the course of including study participants as active, empowered partners, a sociologist needs to establish some sort of useful boundaries between the speaker's authority and the interpreter's authority, between their words and ours. These problems arise in any qualitative research setting, but are especially relevant in the African context, among unique dynamics of political power and race.

The basic puzzle at the root of everything is this: who can know whom? While the quest for "authenticity" and a useful blend of respondent and writer's voices can be difficult even among researchers and researched of similar backgrounds, the study of Black Africans takes on a very politicized aspect when it is conducted by outsiders who are wealthy, white, and degreed. The question becomes not just "who can know whom?", but also "who wants to know?" and "what are the motives for this knowledge?"

Issues facing a white student of Black Africa are of two types: the more practical, nuts-and-bolts troubles of conducting research, and larger philosophical questions about race, oppression, and their intersections with sociology. To investigate some of the practical problems between a white researcher and an African community, I examine Bozzoli's book Women of Phokeng: Consciousness, Life Strategy, and Migrancy in South Africa, 1900-1983 (1991).

In Women of Phokeng, Bozzoli's research assistant Mmantho Nkotsoe interviewed elderly Black women about their life stories to create a gendered regional history. In that simple sentence lies one of the most interesting and troublesome facts about the book: why, if Nkotsoe conducted every interview, is she listed on the book's cover under "with the assistance of" and her voice absent from the text? Here, the problem of authorship has been further complicated by the addition of another person, the research assistant.

Conflicts between research assistants, interviewers, graduate students and their supervising professors are nothing new: what is unique here in the African context are the added dimensions of race and language differences in the author-researcher-subject triangle. While having Nkotsoe, a local of the area and native Setswana speaker, conduct the interviews had the superficial appearance of convenience and cultural sensitivity, it also further complicated the ethical questions about white sociology in Black Africa.

Bozzoli and many of her readers applauded her decision to use a Black woman, one who was a native of Phokeng and spoke the respondent's language as her first language, as her interviewer. The benefits range from easier access into a society of the same racial background, lack of language barrier, to Nkotsoe playing the role of a young woman needing education about "the old days" by a grandmotherly figure from her community.

These factors, while undoubtedly bringing Nkotsoe closer to the respondents, further distances Bozzoli from them. The advantage of having a "native informant" -- or fairly native, since Nkotsoe was distant from the respondents in terms of wealth and education -- is diminished by the fact that Bozzoli never had contact with any of the people her book is about. This removal from the research site increases the social distance between the author and the community they're studying. Ironically, it is Bozzoli, who never met the Phokeng women, who is considered the "author", not Nkotsoe. Along with authorship, too, comes authority: tenure, royalties, and recognition.

Arguably, in any context, this distance between the researcher and their subject makes for simply bad sociology; in the context of South Africa it can also send the message to Blacks that they're just not worth the effort for white academics to leave their office. This is made additionally sticky by the fact that Bozzoli is a South African native, and has researched Setswana speakers all her career, but does not speak the language. In a situation where she wished to be culturally and linguistically sensitive, she also cultivated an aura of standoffish power around the white researcher over her Black assistant and Black interviewees.

To be fair to Bozzoli, however, issues of cultural and language difference are not easy to address in research. As Hassim and Walker (1993) write, the fundamental divisions of race and class may overreach any tangible considerations of who does interviews and who writes books. By articulating different points of view from academics and women's rights activists at a Conference on Women and Gender in South Africa, Hassim and Walker pose many difficult broader questions about "who can know whom".

A basic dichotomy set up in Hassim and Walker's work is that between Black exclusivist and non-racial schools of research on Africa. The first position argues that only Black African women can write fairly and authentically about Black African women, that only experience and similarity of background ensures a non-oppressive research relationship between the sociologist and the community. The latter viewpoint states that race only offers superficial notions of sameness, and unfairly homogenizes the class and ethnicity differences that exist within Black communities. In a plural society like South Africa -- eleven official languages now recognized -- it is misleading to create bipolar distinctions between simply "white" and "black".

While racial differences between social researchers and respondents are among the most obvious variables in the "who can know whom" question, these issues also point to the larger concept of the "insider" versus "outsider" perspective on a people. Is experience in a community the best or only way to gain a useful perspective on it? Or does a culture/race/language/class "outsider" bring in fresh perspectives not biased by everyday life within the practices studied? This is a question that has puzzled social researchers since the days of classic anthropological studies.

As illustrated by Women of Phokeng, categories of cultural insider and outsider are many-faceted. While Nkotsoe may have been the same color as her interviewees, how much comradeship and understanding does this necessarily bestow? As a graduate student, she was distanced from the poor, rural life known by her elderly participants both geographically and culturally. She had been educated in English-speaking institutions and lived in cities modeled on a white, European colonist ideal, and was writing about women who had spent their lives in farm and domestic labor, many of whom were non-literate in any language.

The basic irony is that in any study of oppressed peoples -- here defined broadly as the poor, ethnic minorities, the handicapped, persons disadvantaged on any front -- a researcher is by definition an elite, much separated from these communities even if they are or were a member of these communities on some level. Nkotsoe was a Black South African woman like her interviewees, and therefore they had experiences in common, but she could not in any way be said to have lived a life culturally similar to theirs. Likewise, for example, a poor American who goes to graduate school and returns to study their former neighborhoods will forever be removed from them due to the elite ecosystem of the university and the privileges it bestows.

This difference between academics and non-academics, the power differentials between those who study and those who are studied, exists in any environment and any country, even when the participants are much the same social background as the researcher. This is further exacerbated in the South African context in which power differentials between academics and non-academics are entrenched along racial as well as degree lines. Not only are sociologists "outsiders" from the standpoint of credentialization, but the fact that the vast majority of them are also members of the privileged racial minority further distances them from equal relationships with Black African communities.

One of the conference participants asked the question most pointedly:

"Can an oppressed nation or segment of it, engaged in a struggle for liberation from its oppressors, rely on knowledge produced, researched, and theorized by others, no matter how progressive, who are members of the oppressor nation?" (Hassim and Walker 1993: 525).

This position, while undoubtedly true on some level, automatically invokes its opposite. It could also be construed as another form of racism to assume that a researcher's ethnicity automatically informs the quality of their work. Hassim and Walker offer the alternative idea that:

"those who are critical of the scholarship produced by white or non-African academics about black women have to demonstrate where it is wrong, rather than merely invoke the author's...skin color as a self-explanatory weakness" (1993: 531).

Clearly, solutions to these dilemmas do not easily present themselves. I tend to agree more with the second quotation, that white researchers of Black Africa can not be peremptorily dismissed, but I also acknowledge the predisposition of work produced by elites to preserve the status quo.

In South Africa, perhaps the best improvement for the future of sociology is simply expanding the ranks of universities to include more African students, researchers, and professors, to increase the multiplicity of research voices to include "insiders", "outsiders", and all the social worlds in between. This is easier said than done, but is infinitely more reachable a goal under the new integrationist government. Of course, removing racial boundaries to academia does not alleviate the poverty that keeps a diverse student and professor body at bay, but under the reforms of democratization we can hope that access to education can only improve on every front.

My critique of Bozzoli's work also offers practical research suggestions. The first and foremost is the learning of African languages as a point of entry into their respective cultures. I fully support the idea that interviews should be conducted in the first language of the respondent, and that the author(s) of the final text should be as well versed as possible in this language. Arguably, a non-native speaker can never approach the fluency of a native speaker, but a white sociologist's attempt to learn and speak an African language can only bring them closer to study participants. To bridge the fluency gap, research teams could be established between white and African sociologists; for example, if Bozzoli and Nkotsoe had conducted interviews jointly. Even if Bozzoli had simply been present, not knowing a word of Setswana, she would at least have sent the message that she was personally interested in these women's lives.

Ethics: What is the purpose of sociology?

The issue of the absent white author raises ethical questions about the end products of social research. Bozzoli reaped rewards from the publication of her book without having personal contact with the community or individual women it described. This projects the image of the academic as distant, as one who makes their career with little involvement with their populations of study. At best morally neutral, this position could potentially become exploitive. Do we "enjoy the luxury of research, but thrive on black disadvantage" for our "publications and promotions" (Hassim and Walker 1993: 526,529)?

The other alternative, of academic as activist, is equally problematic. Bozzoli (1990) and Kasper (1994) offer two different philosophies of how and why activism can be accomplished. Bozzoli, in many ways a classic Marxist, views academics as participants in class liberation struggles. By bringing academic perspectives to the masses, social researchers can aid in the self-education of oppressed peoples.

This view is difficult for me on two fronts. For one, it's condescending; without using Marx's term "false consciousness", this perspective of academic as political liberator nonetheless has overtones of the scholar's duty to impart the wisdom of oppression on the less insightful proletariat. Secondly, this philosophy seems contradictory. If the academic aids in the overthrow of elites, what happens to them when universities are egalitarian and credentials meaningless? This is illustrated by Bozzoli's (1990) description of an "open history" conference she helped to organize.

The intent of the conference was to provide fora for papers, films, speakers, plays, and other forms of expressing a people's history of South Africa. It was to be totally open to all, not just academics, and they tried to create a multi-class atmosphere of participation. Bozzoli lauds this accomplishment, but becomes uneasy when the "people" seem to be taking over the proceedings a little too much and change the programs and event agendas. Although beginning from the position of devaluing the academic's authority, the conference organizers seem to have established limits on just how devalued that authority is allowed to be. Perhaps they realized that if the goal of professor as liberator is achieved, many of their class and credential benefits will be obsolete.

Kasper (1994) takes a less political and more personal approach to the activist role of the sociologist. Although not working specifically with Africans, her view of good social research as advocacy offers a good comparison to Bozzoli's perspective. Kasper uses terms like "consciousness raising", "ethic of caring", and "I attempt to meet her [respondent's] needs" (1994: 263, 268, 270). This is the language of therapy, and poses the question if therapy is or should be a goal of social research.

Research on women will almost always have a political, emancipatory angle, particularly projects which attempt to uncover subjective and previously understudied aspects of women's lives. Kasper's position, however, blurs the lines between academic researcher, psychotherapist, and biographer. While a sociologist, of course, would always aspire to be close to their respondents, this converse of being a deeply committed advocate is not without its problems.

Sociologists are (conventionally) not trained in therapy and processes of psychological healing; if an investigator seems to make these sorts of promises to respondents, study participants could be left high and dry wondering from where these supports and emotional benefits will come. To transpose this to the African context, adopting the position of therapist for one's study participants is more problematic. Western feminist concepts of advocacy, emancipation, and consciousness-raising may have little resonance in rural Africa, in communities where American-style feminism is, at best, inappropriate and at worst, viewed as a colonial imposition.

Kasper's work also crosses lines between academic and non-academic writing. She describes a situation in her research in which a respondent asked to be given the tape recorder so she could continue talking and conduct her own interview without Kasper. Interestingly, Kasper takes this to be "a direct compliment on my interviewing technique" (1994: 272). What then, is the boundary between social research and autobiography? If a respondent alone with a tape recorder constitutes an "interview", why do we even need the sociologist? Here, Kasper would argue that part of being a fair, feminist researcher is to make one's voice as silent as possible.

This connects us back to debates about authorship. In this interview situation, like Bozzoli's with the Phokeng women, Kasper's involvement is very minimal, yet she still reaps authorship benefits. While Kasper sees her non-invasive style as politically sensitive, I would argue that it's also politically dangerous; she like Bozzoli gets publication and recognition for work that she had less input in producing. To me, this is more of an unbalanced power relationship between studier and studied than the traditional context of having an interviewer present during the interview. In the latter situation, the researcher can be involved, interested, and responsible for the proceedings.

Conclusions

This analysis has hopefully highlighted interesting and relevant questions for the qualitative researcher, but can not offer, unfortunately, any quick or definite solutions. Primary debates about what constitutes qualitative research epistemologies, methods, and political orientations remain unresolved, and the best that a writer can do is make conscious choices for each appropriate to their project at hand. Ideally, a social researcher would be versed in several different investigation styles, and could access data through traditional and non-traditional routes. If definitions of what is "qualitative", "inductive" and "feminist" remain cloudy, sociologists have an obligation to make clear to their readers their own usages of the terms.

The authorship of qualitative work with active participants remains problematic, especially in African contexts where white researchers have racial and class power over their Black respondents. As illustrated by Bozzoli's Women of Phokeng, it is not easy to strike a balance between gaining access to a community (delegating research tasks to African assistants) and being an involved author and doing the interviews yourself. My best recommendation is for non-African sociologists to learn the language of their population of interest, and integrate themselves as fully as possible into the interview process. To do otherwise is to send politically ambiguous messages about the author's priorities and commitment to the community of study.

Debates about the role of sociologists and their work also continue. Kasper's (1994) characterization of an almost-absent researcher, and her position of sociologist as advocate blurs divisions between social research, psychotherapy, and biography. In contrast, Bozzoli's philosophy is one of sociologist as Marxist political activist. In the quest for emancipatory, feminist knowledge about the social world, however, I believe we must treat sociological theories and information as what they are: sociological theories and information, not programs of therapy or political platforms.

This is not to diminish the empowering and maybe even revolutionary potential of insightful qualitative research, but a sociologist's obligations are to produce that research, not to counsel respondents or develop governments. To blur boundaries between psychology, political activism, and literature is to detract from and muddle the strengths of sociological tools of understanding: data gathering, analysis, and theorization. These tools must work with the realms of politics and psychology to better develop a feminist agenda, but can not replace them.

References

Bozzoli, Belinda. 1985. "Migrant women and South African social change: Biographical approaches to social analysis." Pp. 87-96 in African Studies, 44 (1).

Bozzoli, Belinda. 1990. "Intellectuals, audiences, and histories: South African experiences, 1978-88." Pp. 237-263 in the Radical History Review, 46 (7).

Bozzoli, Belinda and Mmantho Nkotsoe. 1991. Women of Phokeng: Consciousness, Life Strategy, and Migrancy in South Africa, 1900-1983. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.

Hassim, Shireen and Cherryl Walker. 1993. "Women's studies and the women's movement in South Africa: Defining a relationship." Pp. 523-534 in the Women's

Studies International Forum, 16 (5).

Kasper, Anne S. 1994. "A feminist, qualitative methodology: A study of women with breast cancer." Pp. 263-281 in Qualitative Sociology, 17 (3).

Ribbens, Jane and Rosalind Edwards. 1995. "Introducing qualitative research on women in families and households." Pp. 247-258 in the Women's Studies International Forum, 18 (3).

Risman, Barbara A. 1993. "Methodological implications of feminist scholarship." Pp. 15-25 in The American Sociologist, 24 (3,4).

[email protected]

909 Social Sciences

267 19th Ave. S.

Minneapolis, MN 55455

The division between the qualitative and quantitative bodies within the larger body of psychological research.

Here we are talking about the battle between "old" and "new paradigm" research. On the one hand we are dealing with the positivistic paradigm of modernity, at the core of which lies the belief in a knowable, objective, manipulable and fixed reality, a world that, in the discovery of its universal laws or basic working principles, will eventually bend the knee to the expertise and knowhow of the scientist. On the other hand we have those who propagate new paradigm research according to which we need to move into the domain of uncertainty where truth eludes us (Polkinghorne, 1982). Where university becomes multiversity and different realities can co-exist. Where measurement, prediction and control is no longer the focus, but a stage is set for stories to be told through the voice of the researcher. Where meaningful dialogue is sought through co-involvement of researcher and research participants and the result is a new democracy between the investigator, the informant and the phenomena of research (Taylor, 1990).

In the study of the meaning of suffering among Holocaust survivors we were struck by the way in which the Holocaust reflects the culmination of modernist thinking, but also echoes the disillusionment of the postmodern era with the beliefs underlying such thinking. In his work "Modernity and the Holocaust" Bauman (1989) translates the scientific idealism of the day into the will to power that earmarked a movement like Nazism. The scientific stance of the modern era which emphasized pure rationality and freedom from "contamination" by emotive and moral involvement in the object of study, was uncannily reflected in the SS slogan - Eiskalt - cold-blooded murder with no investment of emotive factors (Bauer, 1987). On the other hand, the horror of the Holocaust left mankind disillusioned with any ideology or utopian dream of mastery of the world - a disillusionment shared by post-modern thinking. Its research stance being extremely sceptical of a science that propagates this belief through increased knowhow, power and control and instead embraces uncertainty and incompleteness (Kvale, 1994).

Perhaps one would like to ponder the idea of the belief systems which have governed and are presently governing thinking in the South Africa context.

The dangers of polarisation

Those of us who position ourselves within the body of qualitative research would probably agree on the dangers involved in taking an extreme modernistic stance, but have we thought of the dangers of an extreme qualitative stance in which we take up the fight against the positivistic part of the research body? A fear of contamination with the rigidity of the positivistic stance can lead qualitative researchers to strive for an openness and non-prescriptive stance which no longer serves the body of knowledge. It is our contention that the new or younger body should acknowledge its Newtonian roots and the value of these roots, lest it be compared to the rebellious child who wishes to gain independence by trying to behave in ways contrary to that of the parent, whilst in actuality displaying many of the very characteristics of the parent and perhaps desperately needing these roots to survive. The very principles of openness and inclusiveness underlying new paradigm research would of course disallow such exclusion. It is our contention that we need to move away from the dogma of any extreme stance to a level beyond polarisation where the nature of the research phenomena and the sincere wish to serve the body of knowledge becomes the focus.

The division between the different qualitative body parts

Different qualitative approaches, for example, the phenomenological, the heuristic, hermeneutical and constructivist approaches are all parts of the qualitative research body. The danger of rigid divisions between these body parts seems to be relevant as well.

The study of the meaning of suffering among Holocaust survivors was originally typified as a phenomenological study with heuristic and hermeneutic underpinnings and had to be changed to a heuristic study with phenomenological and hermeneutic underpinnings. The reason for the change being necessitated by the criticism that a phenomenological research approach does not allow one to enter into the research context with any preconceived ideas, whereas a heuristic approach allows the researcher to explore the phenomenon through the pathways of his or her own soul.

Of course we learnt that when positioning yourself in the body of qualitative research it is important to move beyond labels and rather not 'name your child' as the phenomena dealt with by new paradigm research very seldom allow one to use only some parts of the body.

However, we need to ask whether the 'identity' of the different parts of the qualitative body could perhaps be attributed to the way in which they liaise with the old paradigm? Are some parts of the child perhaps portraying the very prescriptiveness of the old paradigm parent in insisting on being theoretical unbiased and steering clear of anything that smacks of pre-set hypotheses based on some set theory about the phenomenon in question? Fearing to be indoctrinated by theory, new paradigm researchers, for example, choose to do a literature survey at a point near the end of the research, and not at the beginning, where it might act to predispose and predetermine or colour the researcher's awareness (Moustakas, 1971). However, in the present study it was the research participants themselves who insisted on exactly the opposite.

One survivor told the researcher that he had been approached by a young student to be interviewed. He asked her how much she knew about the Holocaust. "Virtually nothing", she replied. "Well then you have no right to interview me", he said as he politely showed her the door.

The survivors see ignorance about the Holocaust as indicative of a woeful ignorance about the history of the world we live in, and to their mind, means lack of understanding. In fact, the main thrust of the Holocaust survivors' organization, the She'erith Hapletah (which means : the surviving remnant) is to disseminate knowledge about the Holocaust and to fight the battle of prejudice based on ignorance.

However, it is also important to note that the dehumanizing experiences of the survivors in the concentration and death camps, have made the survivors super-sensitive to any form of experimental research. An example will illustrate this.

A questionnaire had been sent out by a research organization based in New York to survivors worldwide relating to their experiences during the Holocaust. This provoked angry responses from the research participants. "How dare they! To be treated like a statistic, we who were made objects of experimentation in the Nazi death camps". One survivor angrily pulled up her sleeve to show the number tattooed on her forearm. "I was nothing but a number, see! ..."

This reminds us of Maslow's words: 'If the only tool you have is a hammer, it is tempting to treat everything as if it were a nail' (Maslow, 1966, p. x).

Choosing an approach for a specific context

In view of the foregoing discussion it seems important for the qualitative researcher to move beyond prescription and division onto a level where participant and researcher can converse about the research phenomena in a manner suited to the specific context.

In seeking to do research involving survivors, the employment of any uniform method or specific technique seemed inappropriate. What was required was a sensitive and discerning personal involvement of the researcher with the survivors in order to re-create a full and complete depiction of the lived experience. The phenomenon was researched, not only from within the context or framework of the research participants, but also from within the life world of the researcher. The focus was on the interplay of meaning in the joint exploration into and discourse about the phenomenon in question (Moustakas, 1985).

The study on the meaning of suffering among Holocaust survivors posed very specific problems for the researcher. Whilst the research phenomenon clearly asked for a qualitative research approach, this approach mitigated against a literature survey before the period of interviewing, whilst it was clear that respect for the survivors would be shown in being intelligently informed on the subject of the Holocaust before trying to elicit the survivors' participation in research.

We decided to move beyond the paradox and therefore beyond the notion that it is possible to turn the mind of the qualitative researcher into a tabularasa - a notion which, as we pointed out earlier on, represents an extreme emphasis on openness, but at the same time smacks of old paradigm thinking!)..

This reminds one of Scott Peck's words about the American people which could certainly also apply to South Africans: "Perhaps the greatest problem in this country is how 5 percent who comprehend paradox can communicate with the 95 percent who don't" (Peck, 1995, p. 371).

On the level beyond the paradox an unbiased approach becomes possible. This approach represents a state of preparedness or openness of mind that can only be achieved through a great deal of intelligent contemplation on and an in-depth study of the nature of the phenomenon to be studied, plus a willingness to be led into whatever avenue may reveal more about the subject and enable the researcher to have a better grasp of the phenomenon.

In the present research this resulted in an intensive study of the works and experience of famous Holocaust survivors such as Viktor Frankl, Elie Wiesel, Bruno Bettelheim, Katzetnik and others. Several visits to the Yad Vashem or Holocaust Memorial Museum in Jerusalem, the biggest archive on Holocaust documentation in the world, were undertaken: its courses attended; apart from an immersion into the literature of the Holocaust itself. Holocaust scholars themselves testify to the importance of holding one's mind in the fires of the Holocaust long enough for it to be purified, that is, freed from the false presuppositions and vanities of thought (Kren & Rappoport, 1980). This was personally experienced by the researcher when she spent several months struggling through the monumental documentary on the Holocaust written by the historian, Martin Gilbert (1986). As Staub (1989) contends, the struggle of survivors implicates everyone who has any dealings with them and so the researcher also had to be prepared to be scrutinized by questions of conscience.

It doesn't seem to be significant whether the researcher has any hypotheses or presuppositions about the phenomenon of research, or does a literature study before the research phase or not. What does matter is the way in which the literature survey is used. Depending on how a literature survey is done, it need not instill prejudice but can open up the researcher's mind by removing the obstacles of ignorance and lack of understanding. It can break down stereotypical ways of perceiving, reveal presuppositions that the researcher may not even have been aware of. It can shock the researcher into new ways of thinking and feeling; sensitize him or her to the research issue at hand.

Conclusion: working towards a body politic in psychological research.

We came to the realization that old and new paradigm researchers are making too much of their differences - that they are disagreeing on issues where there should be agreement and causing a blurring of those issues which do distinguish them.

The point we wish to make is that the method must dialogue with the content (Frankl, 1974; Giorgi, 1970; Keen, 1975; Kelly, 1969; Kruger, 1987; Mahoney, 1981; Maslow, 1972; May, 1965; Moustakas, 1990; Polanyi, 1969; Reason & Rowan, 1981; Rogers, 1985; Romanyshyn, 1971; Schurink, 1988; Taylor, 1990; Valle & King, 1978; Van Kaam, 1966; Von Eckartsberg, 1986). Whatever our research persuasions, we are all dealing with psychological realities which we study in an intensive, rigorous and systematic way. Our differences are merely in terms of positioning. From positivistic and experimental (quantitative) methodologies dealing with human phenomena on a more discernable or accessible level, new paradigm research approaches dealing with phenomena of a more complex or abstract nature. There is an interesting shift in the following: from the more objective to the more subjective; from the tangible to the intangible; from the concrete to the abstract; from the observational to the experiential; from the manipulable to the revelatory; from calculative to meditative thinking; from closure to openness; from certainty to uncertainty; from independence to dependence; from neutrality to commitment.

We contend that these different research stances are all legitimate and should be recognized as such. We are scientists to the degree that we are attuned to the specific nature of the data or phenomena of our different fields of research. What distinguishes us are the subtle but all the more dramatic changes in our particular phenomena of study, which if we are scientists, we should be dedicated to and led by. We may change in the tenure of hardness and softness, but stay alike in our rigour, exactitude and precision, which in the case of quantitative methodologies are expressed in terms of measurement and in the case of qualitative methodologies in terms of understanding.

What we as qualitative researchers sometimes fail to recognize is the fact that, dealing with phenomena of human experience and understanding, with the inner mental grasp of basically spiritual matter, we are entering domains where rigidity should soften; boundaries of difference should dissolve; a change from dogmatic stances of mutual exclusiveness to stances of interdependence and awe in the face of truths that are bigger than ourselves should occur. We are dealing with the flow of a process and with relatedness rather than with stipulated steps of prescribed technique. In the body of qualitative research we should move away from closure, specific technique, discernable differences, exact procedure, a stepping on another's methodological toes, without sacrificing discipline, dedication, commitment, rigour and integrity.

We need harmony between rigour and imagination. And perhaps we might experience what Maslow (1966, p. 147) spoke about when he said:

"One can love science even though it is not perfect, just as one can love one's wife even though she is not perfect. And, fortunately, for just a moment and as an unexpected and undeserved reward they sometimes do become perfect and take our breath away".

References

Bauer, Y. (1987). On the place of the Holocaust in history. Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 2(2), 209-220.

Bauman, Z. (1989). Modernity and the Holocaust. New York: Cornell University Press.

Bettelheim, B. (1961). The informed heart. London: Thames & Hudson.

Bettelheim, B. (1979). Surviving and other essays. London: Thames & Hudson.

Bettelheim, B. (1986). Surviving the Holocaust. London: Fontana.

Cohen, E.A. (1988). Human behaviour in the concentration camp. London: Free Association Books.

Dimsdale, J.E. (1980). The coping behaviour of Nazi concentration camp survivors. In J.E. Dimsdale (ed)., Survivors, victims, and perpetrators: Essays on the Nazi Holocaust (pp. 163-174). New York: Hemisphere.

Douglas, B.G., & Moustakas, C. (1985). Heuristic inquiry: the internal search to know. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 23(3), 39-55.

Frankl, V.E. (1968). Man's search for meaning. An introduction to logotherapy. London: Hodder & Stoughton.

Frankl, V.E. (1974). Logotherapeutic approach to personality. In W.S. Sahakian (Ed.), Psychology of personality: Readings in theory (pp. 184-203). Chicago: Rand McNally.

Gilbert, M. (1986). The Holocaust: The Jewish tragedy. Glasgow: Collins.

Giorgi, A. (1970). Psychology as a human science. A phenomenologically based approach. New York: Harper & Row.

Hayek, F.A. (1951). The counter-revolution of science. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

Husserl, E. (1970). The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology. An introduction to phenomenological philosophy. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.

Katzetnik 135633 (1956). House of dolls. London: Frederick Muller.

Katzetnik 135633 (1969). Phoenix over the Galilee. New York: Harper & Row.

Katzetnik 135633 (1971). Star Eternal. New York: Arbor House.

Katzetnik 135633 (1977). Sunrise over hell. London: Allen.

Keen, E. (1975). A primer in phenomenological psychology. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Kelly, G.A. (1969). Humanistic methodology in psychological research. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 11(1), 53-65.

Kren, G.M. & Rappoport, I. (1980). Holocaust and the crisis of human behaviour. New York: Holmes & Meier.

Kruger, D. (1987). In search of a human science psychology. South African Journal of Psychology, 18(1), 1-9.

Kuhn, (1970). The counter-revolution of science.

Kvale, S. (1994). Psychology and postmodernism. London: Sage Publications.

Levi, P. (1977). Survival in Auschwitz: The Nazi assault on humanity. New York: MacMillan.

Lyotard, J-F. (1987). The Postmodern condition: A report on knowledge. Manchester: University Press.

Mahoney, M.J. (1981). Clinical psychology and scientific inquiry. International Journal of Psychology, 16, 257-274.

Mahoney, M.J. (1989). Scientific psychology and radical behaviourism. American Psychologist, 44(11), 1372-1377.

Maslow, A.H. (1968). Toward a psychology of being. Princeton: Van Nostrand.

Maslow, A.H. (1972). The further reaches of human nature. New York: Viking Press.

May, R. (1965). Intentionality, the heart of human will. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 5, 202-209.

Moustakas, C. (1971). Individuality and encounter: A brief journey into loneliness and sensitivity groups. Massachusetts: Doyle.

Moustakas, C. (1990). Heuristic research. Design and methodology. Person-Centered Review, 5(2), 170-190.

Polanyi, M. (1969). Knowing and being. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Polkinghorne, D. (1982). What makes research humanistic? Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 22(3), 47-54.

Reason, P., & Rowan, J. (1981). Issues of validity in new paradigm research. In P. Reason & J. Rowan (Eds.), Human inquiry: A sourcebook of new paradigm research (pp. 239-252). Chichester: Wiley.

Rogers, C.R. (1985). Toward a more human science of the person. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 25(4), 7-24.

Romanyshyn, R.D. (1971). Method and meaning in psychology: The method has been the message. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 2(1), 93-113.

Skinner, B.F. (1976). Walden Two. New York: MacMillan.

Staub, E. (1089). The roots of evil. The origin of genocide and other group violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Taylor, D.S. (1990). Making the most of your matrices: Hermeneutics, statistics and the repertory grid. International Journal of Personal Construct Psychology, 3, 105-119.

Valle, R.S., & King, M. (1978). Existential-phenomenological alternative for psychology. New York: Oxford University Press.

Von Eckardtsberg, R. (1986). Life-world experience. Existential-phenomenological approaches in psychology. Washington: University Press.

[email protected]

Department of Psychology

University of South Africa

PO Box 392

Pretoria

0003

Physics and the humanities were developed simultaneously by sir Isaac Newton and John Locke more or less during the 17th century and on the same philosophical basis. It was not until the late 19th century that a formal programme was proposed for generally applying the scientific method to the study of social and human sciences. The rules of science were applied equally to studies in the physical sciences and in human behaviour.

Researchers' reliance on empirical data, reason and scientific laws to describe, explain, declare and predict phenomena is often called positivism. According to the positivistic philosophical viewpoint, scientific laws are recognisable either through fundamentalism, or more readily through empirical research.

Yet, idealistic researchers argue with a counter-approach: Since the method and contents of science are the products of human thought, reality and truth cannot be found 'out there', as positivists assume, but are made up by the researchers themselves. Reality does not exist independently of our minds, but depends on the constituting activities of our minds.

The social and human sciences, and the methodological problems therein, can be seen as ranging on a continuum where demography and cultural anthropology fall toward the two extremes, with sociology, psychology and education placed somewhere in between. These middle-position disciplines tend to rely on quantitative surveys and methods, although recently qualitative research methods are used increasingly.

An either-or approach towards quantity and quality in research methodology continues to receive support and stimulate debate, and also motivates and guides many researchers in their work. When you have time to glance at Table 1 that was handed out to you at the beginning of the session, I am sure that the issues stated in the table on either side are not new to you. I will come back to some of these issues a bit later.

For now, I would like to remark that the split between the two approaches still pervades the social and human sciences. Many considerations and objections have been raised against both sides in the past years. It is not sure whether this debate will ever end as long as the luxury of research can be afforded. But should it end? The debate certainly sharpens the researcher's awareness of both the advantages and disadvantages of the two approaches. But on the other hand, perhaps this dualism also contributes to the unpopular image of research methodology today.

This is my concern:

• How can the image of research methodology in the social sciences be improved?

• What should be included in tertiary curricula in order to optimise formal training in research methodology?

• What activities do effective research methodologists occupy themselves with?

  Questions like these need an empirical study of international proportions. Before I embark on the launching of the project, it is necessary to briefly state some problems that led to this project. Although the academic value of research methodology is seldom disputed, it is generally known that research methodology is not perceived as accessible by many social scientists and students. Most textbooks on research methodology for the social sciences take special care to place the value of this field in context, and motivate readers not to become discouraged by its content.

  Despite this, the stigma attached to research methodology largely remains. Why is research methodology experienced as being inaccessible?

  Firstly, the circumstances in which research methodology are usually introduced and presented are not always ideal - when needed, the situation frequently already is a crisis, and when formally provided, it often forms part of another training course such as psychology, sociology or education, and then the subject matter appears to be very theoretical and technical.

  Secondly, practicalities such as the heterogeneity within the group receiving formal training might produce problems. Not all the people have the same level of mathematical insight, which is further hampered by the group size to which research methodology is presented.

  Many researchers react to these problems by side-stepping them in some way or other. For example, researchers are often perceived to withdraw from the respective application fields they were originally trained in. They are sometimes labelled as being different, having little contact with people or reality, being too computer-bound, labelling and reducing people and maintaining the mystique of research. These labels are certainly not new.

  Over the last few decades people within the social sciences have come to passively accept this situation, believing "that's how it is; there's nothing to be done about it". Do you know of any one in the social sciences who has actively worked to change the situation and image of research methodology? The current image of research methodology does the social sciences no good, and needs to be understood and eventually altered. This is the purpose of this international research project, which can be divided into a theoretical and an empirical part.

  The theoretical part of this research is characterised by the following assumption: A theoretical reconceptualisation of identified themes within the context of research methodology in the social sciences will be useful.

  For this purpose, as a first step an extensive computerised, international literature survey has been conducted on an ongoing basis since 1989, resulting in approximately 1 500 references (mainly in English) that have recently been published, either as a book, or as an article. The initial focus is broad so as not to limit two researchers (who work independently to establish interrater reliability) in their activities.

  In the first procedure of analysis the titles of these references have been studied within an ecosystemic-epistemological perspective by means of formal content analysis, based on the latest work of Miles and Huberman. The purpose of this analysis was to build a complex matrix of categorical and classified themes. The matrix basically works as follows: On a horizontal level, the categories represent the diversity of aspects that research methodologists work with and write about. On a vertical level, the classes denote some hierarchy in which the various aspects are dealt with. Naturally a single reference source simultaneously can occur more than once in the matrix of themes. The matrix is continuously updated with the latest references picked up by weekly literature surveys.

  Secondly, the matrix of themes will then be refined by analysing the abstracts of a further 20% of the references made available by the literature study. This procedure of first-order analysis will stimulate and form the basis for the empirical part of the research.

  Based on the same assumption as stated earlier, here the emphasis will be placed on an empirical reconceptualisation of the identified themes by using the Delphi technique as an ecosystemic method.

  Delphi is a group process which utilises written responses as opposed to bringing individuals together. It is a means of aggregating the ideas of a number of individuals in order to improve the quality of decision making. Because Delphi does not require face-to-face contact, it is particularly useful for involving experts, users, resource controllers, or administrators who cannot come together physically. Delphi allows people to remain anonymous, but prevents domination by certain individuals.

  Delphi is essentially a series of questionnaires, where each subsequent questionnaire is built upon responses to the preceding questionnaire with increasing structure. The process stops when consensus has been reached among participants, or when sufficient information has been obtained.

  If you are interested in participating in this international research project, or know of any users of, experts, resource controllers, or administrators in research methodology who would be interested in participating, then please fill in an invitation form and put the tear-off slip with your contact particulars in the envelope provided after this session.

  This invitation to participate is valid until 30 September 1996. Thereafter the process of data gathering will commence. We assume that a series of three questionnaires will be sufficient to complete the project. In order to allow for possible postal delays (although we prefer communication via e-mail or telefax), each questionnaire will be sent out in a different month. The only requirements for participation are that participants must complete the whole series of questionnaires, and return it within the set target dates. Thus participants must set time (approximately 45 minutes per month, but it may vary) aside to complete and return one questionnaire each in October, November, December and possibly January 1997. The success of the data-gathering phase largely depends on the co-operation of the participants! It would be greatly appreciated if participants could complete and return the questionnaire on the same day of receipt to help ensure that the data gathering proceeds smoothly.

  We undertake to acknowledge all participants in the final report, unless not desired. A copy of the report will be made available to the participants if requested. As your opinion will aid in reaching the goals of this project, we hope that you will be interested in and find time to participate.

  Pre-selected control characteristics will be used to ensure a high standard for quota sampling, chosen to enhance international contributions. The same procedure of first-order analysis that was applied to the literature, will be performed on the results of each phase of the Delphi technique. Second-order and third-order analysis will be performed on all the results as far as possible. The steps are as follows:

  First-order analysis, which entails

  Exploration, addressing the question of what, and where we basically label the units of meaning and the categories.

  Step 1: Familiarisation of the topic

  Step 2: Drawing of distinctions and labelling of units of meaning

  Step 3: Labelling of categories

  Step 4: Establishment of reliability and validity of categories

  
  
  

  Second-order analysis, where we look at Description, addressing the question of how, by basically labelling and describing pattern categories.

  Step 1: Development and labelling of pattern categories

  Step 2: Description of pattern categories

  Step 3: Establishment of acceptance of pattern categories

  
  
  

  Third-order analysis, where we will deal with Explanation, addressing the question of why by having a conceptual discussion of the pattern categories.

  
  
  

  Step 1: Conceptual discussion

  From the analyses the identified themes from both the theoretical and empirical parts of the research will be explored to develop guidelines for use in tertiary curricula, as well as for the marketing and application of research methodology in practice.

  Now that the empirical research project has been dealt with on a first-order level, let us consider the processes involved in the project. In other words, let us look at what lies behind the scene, from a second-order point of view.

  In terms of the quantity-quality debate and the handout that was given to you at the beginning of the session, I would like to argue that social-science research methodologists of both approaches are concerned with the same issues, although they may employ different terms to describe these issues. For example, quantitative researchers concern themselves with ensuring validity and reliability through various quantifiable measures of construct, content, coherence, etcetera, and computations of the appropriate coefficients. Compare this to the qualitative researcher's concern for data accuracy and verification through social agreement, consensus and correspondence.

  Many more such examples appear in Table 1.

  Criticisms are being directed at methods when it is really the paradigmatic world view that is under attack. No matter what side of, or where in Table 1 one's affinity lies, at its basis lies the one question of what is to count as knowledge. When probing for the answer to this question, we become aware of the basis for the authority of our knowledge.

  Some of the existing problems regarding research methodology can be avoided by substituting the quantity-quality debate with the concept of structure. The term structure means formal and systematic organisation. In the Oxford English Dictionary structure is defined as "the mutual relation of the constituent parts or elements of a whole as determining its peculiar nature or character". The presence of structure implies that, on a paradigmatic level, some hierarchy or relationship or pattern is present in research methodology.

  All research methods are structured to some degree, whether quantitative or qualitative in nature. There is no simple dichotomy between quantitative and qualitative methods. Rather, there is a continuum on which a variety of different methods may be located with varying degrees of structure. However, one should be careful not to view the presence of structure as a frequency count. In such a case the concept of structure will be a mere substitution of the quantity-quality debate; just more of the same thing, another name for the same problem.

  What is important, is what one does with the structure that is present within research methodology, how one sees the hierarchy, the relationship, or the pattern within research methodology. The notion of structure in this way captures the complexity of methodological practice. This indicates that the gap between quantity and quality as stated in Table 1 is trivial.

  Within this paradigm it is possible to blend the two traditional perspectives quite successfully. The complexity of a phenomenon under study is intercepted when both perspectives are used integratively. The research method does not stand in isolation from the research process. Theory, data-gathering methods and data analysis stand in a reciprocal relationship to each other. A researcher cannot effectively gather data without a thorough consideration and accommodation of the data analysis which will follow, and the theory on which the research is based.

  Good researchers do not begin with a theory, then prove or probe it empirically. Rather, they begin with a phenomenon - that is, a problem, a question. The applied research method should ideally arise from the requirements of the specific phenomenon under study, and then fitted into the theory, paradigm, research context, format and analysis technique of the researcher's choice. The link or fit between these research parts of a sound project is the nature of the structure (and not the degree of structure) that is present in each of them. Let us go back to the empirical study discussed earlier:

  Table 2 deals with the nature of the structure that is present in both the theoretical and empirical parts of the research project. Firstly, the assumption that a reconceptualisation of research methodology into identified themes will be useful, either from published works, or from responding in Delphi style, gives an arbitrary starting point and specific structure to the project.

  Initially the gathering and analysis of the data is and will be done deductively - in the beginning the focus is broad so as not to limit the type of references or the participants' responses, beginning with a general question, working towards a point where consensus will be reached. The identification of themes (or categories of themes) implies that it is the researchers who create and give meaning to the various research units that were or will be made available. The conceptual discussion of the pattern categories gives an inductive approach to the data analysis. Thus the structure within the data analysis can be visually compared with an hourglass.

  Since the first research question addresses the what of research methodology through the identification of themes, the analysis is on a first-order level. The how and why questions will be dealt with on higher-order levels of analysis, where structure will be looked at as hierarchies, relationships and patterns, together with an awareness of where the researchers stand in all this. These results will be used to develop the user guidelines needed for tertiary curricula and the marketing of research methodology.

  
  
  

  It is my sincere hope that not only the content of this international project, but also the working procedure as explained to you, will contribute to solving some of the problems that are experienced with research methodology in the social sciences today.

  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  

  Table 2 Structure within the research project

  Theoretical part

  Empirical part

  Assumption: Reconceptualisation of themes

  Identified from literature

  Identified from Delphi responses

  Deductive and inductive gathering and analysis of data

  Beginning with a broad focus, building a matrix of themes that is refined by analy-sing 20% of the abstracts	Beginning with a general question, working towards a situation where consensus is reached on specific issues
  Ending with a selection of references that includes a conceptual discussion of metho-dological contributions from authors' spe-cific research	Ending with a conceptual discussion with selected participants regarding research methodology as indicated with the matrix of themes

  Level of analysis: First order, addressing the question of what The focus is on the identification of themes (and categories of themes)

  Second-order and third-order analysis: Addressing the questions of how and why Looking at least at order, relationships, patterns

  Using the structure that is created within the research results to develop user guidelines for: Tertiary curricula Marketing and application of research methodology in practice

  
  
  

  Table 1 Attributes of quantitative and qualitative approaches

  Quantitative	Qualitative
  A Cartesian orientation is adopted; isolation of parts that can be linked through causes and effects so that the whole equals the sum of its parts (first-order factors), interactive parts (second-order factors, etcetera) and a residue (error factor)	A systemic orientation is adopted; parts are interconnected in a systematic way so that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts; a mutual influence, i.e., recursivity, between parts exist
  Reality exists independently of our minds	Reality depends on the constituting activities of our minds
  Exact concepts, quantified by scales, indexes, etcetera; researchers' perspective	Sensitivity for concepts used by respondents; respon-dents' perspective
  Seeks explanatory facts, the truth or causes for social and human phenomena with little regard for subjective experiences	Concerned with verstehen or understanding, as closely as possible, the behaviour experienced by the respondents
  Correspondence is sought between a statement and an independently existing reality through empirical verifi-cation	A level is maintained where coherent or agreed schemes about reality are constructed; consensual domains form the basis of verification
  "Number-crunchers"	"Story-tellers"
  Sources of information are factual, sensory-observable entities and phenomena that are measurable and quantifiable	Sources of information are meaningful constructs and interactions true to, or constituting the reality of the respondents' experience
  Instruments are a way to achieve an accurate reflection or measurement of an independently existing object	Instruments are extensions of the knowers and operate as an element in their attempts to construct or constitute reality
  Advocates the use of quantitative methods, measure large numbers on often standardised scales, question-naires and coding lists	Advocates the use of qualitative methods obtaining in depth information, such as interviews, participant obser-vation and document analysis
  Mostly obtrusive and unprejudiced measurement that optimises control, for example, a laboratory	Naturalistic and mostly uncontrolled observation based on empathy
  Reliable; 'hard' and replicable data, credibility lies within technical refinement of the instrumentation	Valid; 'real', 'rich', 'soft' and 'deep' data, credibility lies within the skills, sensitivities and capabilities of the researcher
  Expression of findings is provided in a neutral, scientific language that leads to more accuracy and less value-laden descriptions	Report experiences in the language of everyday life; translations to 'scientific language' will only lead to an alternative version of reality
  Removed from the data; the 'outsider' perspective	Close to the data; the 'insider' perspective
  Objective; instrumentation is separate from the researcher	Intersubjective; the researcher is the primary instrument of the research
  Objectivity is seen as an acknowledgement of findings the way they really are; duplication of results is possible	Objectivity is nothing more than social agreement, based on similar justification or persuasion; a commonality of perspective
  Macro-structural	Micro-interpretative
  Ungrounded, verification-oriented, confirmatory, reduc-tionist, inferential and hypothetically deductive	Grounded, discovery-oriented, exploratory, empathically, descriptive and inductive
  Data analysis by means of descriptive, inferential and multivariate statistical techniques	Data analysis by means of interpretative frameworks, models, schemes, etcetera
  Focus on multiple case studies with the aim to generalise	Focus on single case studies, knowledge and experience; often avoids generalisation
  Strives for generally applicable laws and theories	Strives for interpretative theories and patterns that are often not generalisable
  Context free; standardised responses to preconceived categories	Context bound; concerned with unique and particular settings
  Particularistic, outcome-oriented, sets of momentary measures of change at cross-sectional or longitudinal points in time	Holistic, process-oriented, dynamic and evolutionary sensitivity to change
  Assumes a stable reality, where measurement is (re-peatedly) performed in a periodically static environment	Assumes a reality where complete stability is never achieved; living constructions and accounts are dynamic
  Change in any (interactions of) independent variable(s) will lead to change in the dependent variable(s); change in the dependent variable(s) may lead to change in at least one independent variable (combination)	In an interdependent way, a change in any one part of the system will lead to changes throughout

  
  
  

  * Source: Fiedeldey-Van Dijk, C. (1993). Differentiation as a basis for research methodology: Developing the INDINGILIZI Structured Observation Technique. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Pretoria.

  The contents of Table 1 were extensively adapted from ESRC SURVEY METHODS SEMINAR SERIES (1985-1986), Goldenberg (1992), Mouton (1983), Reichardt and Cook (1979) and Smith (1983).

  
  
  
  
  
  
  

  Biographical note:

  Dr Carina Fiedeldey-Van Dijk, Dphil, a Senior lecturer in Department of Psychology, UP & acting director of CEMCO (Centre for Human Advancement in Psychosocial Context). Registered as a research psychologist at the SAMDC, consider myself to be a research methodologist within the social sciences, actively involved in this field.

  [email protected]

  DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

  UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA

  BROOKLYN 0181

  
  
  

  Dualities and body types

  
  
  

  Dain Peters

  University of Natal (PMB)

  
  
  

  Examining certain dualities (mind/body; self/other) this study analyses the social construction of body image stereotypes in terms of Lowen's (1978) proposed character types. A questionnaire was administered to 40 subjects of different groups (gender, race, age, source). It required the subjects to match Lowen's personality descriptions with his figure drawings, thus testing the social consensus around his proposed personality/body matches. The analysis investigated the clustering of the responses: whether or not they agreed with Lowen's proposal and whether or not they were group-specific. The results demonstrated that no single subject agreed with Lowen's match of personality and body characteristics. There was, however, more agreement around Lowen's Rigid character personality/body match than any of the other propsed matches. The results showed further that there was significant consensus amongst the subjects for other (un-Lowen) personality/body matches: Schizoid/Oral; oral/schizoid and Psychopathic/Masochistic. The results were in no way group-specific in terms of source, age, sex or race

  
  
  

  Questions this paper examines are: How do the dualistic belief systems which keep the mind and the body separate impact on the field of Psychology as a whole, and how are they maintained? Is their any connection between body and personality: "as without, so within"? (Davies, in Radley, 1991) How do people form impressions of others and come to attribute to them particular personalities? How does the body impact on the process of social categorisation?

  In exploring these issues, the paper explores the dangers of dualistic conceptualisation and examines more holistic ways of conceptualising people, amongst these being the inclusion of interpersonal factors and an awareness of the body-mind interpenetration in the field of personology.

  The experiment took a proponent of Bioenergetics and used his five character/body types to examine these questions, it seeming that Alexander Lowen, in his explicit acknowledgment of all these factors might at once present the argument with an exemplary synthesis of these dualisms.

  Within the limitations of the experiment the findings show that there is some kind of reasonably common rationale in operation on the basis of which the general public forms expectations/stereotypes of certain bodyshapes. That these stereotypes do not agree with Alexander Lowen's hypothesis suggests many things. Amongst these are that the recognition of Lowen's "stereotypes" needs either a more practised/trained eye or more evocative (3D) data.

  The experiment was a pilot-study, more exploratory than conclusive and the paper's focus will be more on the theoretical background to it rather than on the study itself.

  
  
  

  1. Personology and dualisms.

  In the branch of Psychology called personology people are studied in order to establish similarities or differences between them in order to understand, explain and predict behaviour. In so doing dominant social beliefs and conceptual frameworks often come to bear on this field and personology, like many other so-called "objective" and "scientific" pursuits may become "ideological": that is serving to perpetuate the status-quo.

  In many instances dualistic conceptual frameworks contribute towards this perpetuation of the status quo. For instance how, where and why the distinction is made between body and mind, or self and other is very often informed and maintained by the whole gamut of social values, controls, norms, power relations etc

  In questioning how dualistic thinking came to influence (some say predominate) our conceptualisation so strongly let us first examine the words themselves. The words "dualism" and "dichotomy" are commonly used as synonyms however in the strict philosophical tradition an interesting and telling distinction is made between the two. A dichotomy involves the splitting of one class into two subclasses, one of which possesses and the other which does not possess a certain quality; whereas dualism involves the use of two principles sometimes complementary and sometimes in conflict. Although in both dualism and dichotomy the subdivisions are exclusive and discrete it is noteworthy that in a dichotomy one of the two groups is merely negatively characterised.

  This is especially intriguing when considering gender for example, which, it is possible to argue, is closer to a dichotomy than to a dualism, feminine being an artificial category characterised merely by an absence of masculine.

  
  
  

  1.1 History and background.

  In terms of the history of dualistic thinking it is interesting to note that it is only in the Christian and Islamic religious traditions that notions of good and bad are dichotomised into two mutually exclusive supreme beings.

  This suggests that there is an ancient legacy to dualistic thinking, that we have inherited the tendency to oversimplify, to set in opposition and to deny the integrative complexity of things.

  Lévi Strauss argues that universal thought is at core binary in nature. He analysed ancient mythology to access the so-called "primitive" universal logic in its " uncontaminated form " (Leach, 1973, p56) and found that the myths are generally concerned with resolving unwelcome contradictions.

  With the structuralist school, of which he is an exponent, Levi Strauss argues that it is in perceiving opposites or contrasts that the mind builds up its perceptions of the world: light/dark, long/short etc. From these "isolated contrasts" the mind seeks analogies with other contrasting phenomena and encompasses the analogies into its system of classification.

  In so arguing Levi-Strauss suggests not only that we have been historically influenced by ancient religious and mythological dualisms but also that binary thinking is integral to how we think and that our minds are pervaded with systems of classification filled with analogous contrasts.

  The binary oppositional nature of conceptualisation was also proposed by the personologist George Kelly who argued that the cognitive system constructed dichotomous classification systems consisting of two contrasting concepts and that these constructs were used in future predictions, expectations and categorizations. Similarly Jung conceived of the psyche contents in binary opposition, animus/anima, etc ( Meyer.et al 1990)

  In conclusion therefore it has been argued that dualistic thinking has its roots in ancient thinking and that it has brought a great influence to bear on religious, social, mythological, scientific and even intra-personal conceptualisation.

  
  
  

  1.2. Dualisms in personology.

  In the field of Personology we see much evidence of dualistic conceptualisation and it might be interesting to highlight a few of them, the repercussions of this conceptualisation and to explore alternative conceptualisations.

  
  
  

  1.2.1. Nature/Nurture.

  The most ready one in personology might be the Nature/Nurture split: the dualism between psychic determinism and environmental determinism.

  The former (associated with Freud) ascribes the aetiology of behaviour characteristics to the individual and the latter (associated with Skinner) to the influence of the environment, and these have been central to much debate in Personology and the understanding of human behaviour.

  Some ramifications of this distinction are notions of volition (victim/controller) and changeability. A topical example of this might be the aetiology of homosexuality which, if viewed as being genetically determined (nature), reduces the likelihood of any intervention altering sexual orientation at the same time as casting the deviant as victim ; while if homosexuality is viewed as being environmentally determined (nurture) the likelihood of altering that sexual orientation is increased at the same time branding the deviant as a pervert. This allows one to see that this dualistic conceptualisation carries with it certain intervention possibilities and value statements about its focus. Another interesting example might be the mad/bad duality which has to be negotiated in forensic cases in terms of determining culpability.

  The word "nature" itself bears with it a history of changing dichotomies, meanings aand value statements. It seems that the concept of "nature" has generally taken its meaning in part from that to which it has been opposed. That is to say that "nature" has been conceptualised as opposed to divine kings, opposed to corrupt society, etc and since 'nature' has been opposed to different doctrines at different points in history, its meaning has shifted accordingly." (McCormack,1980, p20).

  
  
  

  1.2.2. Nature/culture.

  In this regard another instance of a dualism in personology that one comes into contact with is the Nature as opposed to Culture split.

  The ramifications of this dualism becomes more aapparent when one realises, as Jordanova (in MacCormack, 1980) highlights, that in the Enlightenment the "self-conscious scientism" was conceptualised as a male gift and as the way to demystify nature , which was conceptualised as inherently female. Thus we see the Enlightenment's binary opposition (dichotomy ?) of women as natural and men as cultural.

  Jordanova cites Bacon who, in the early Seventeenth century referred to the detailed study of nature by saying: " I am come in very truth leading to you Nature with all her children to bind her to your service and make her your slave. " (MacCormack, 1980, p46).

  Here then is evidenced the danger of binary thinking the centralising of one point of view in the subversion of the other: culture/nature, male/female, master/slave.

  
  
  

  1.2.3. Self-Other.

  Yet another instance of dualistic thinking which one encounters in Personology is that between Self and Other.

  In terms of this, Sampson (1988) in his analysis of the history and myths surrounding individualism, contrasts the Western concept of "self-contained" individualism with other cultures' "ensembled individualism" in which " a person's sense of self is defined through relationship and connection" (1988, p21). He suggests that all cultures make the distinction, different cultures differing only in where they draw the line between self and "nonself other".." ( Sampson, 1988, p15).

  Birke (1994), citing Plumwood, makes a connection between Western culture's strong self/other motif and its relationship to rationality and instrumentalism. She argues that the self defines itself against others and then denies connections with them. (p 141)

  The implications of this are far-reaching, argue Environmental Psychologists, asserting that it is the concept of delimited self in opposition to other which has lead to an ignoring of the other and the indiscriminate violation of environmental rights. (Bateson, 1991)

  This is further evidence of the danger of dualistic thinking, the detaching polarisation of this conceptualisation does not facilitate the understanding and behaviour that a more connected conceptualisation might.

  It is interesting to see these processes in object relations framework which argues that the infant polarizes good and the bad (idealization), splits off the bad (unwanted) part, projects it onto another person and then through projective identification (a Kleinian term) this split off part is reclaimed and is maintained in relationship. It is this " 'recovery' of a modified version of what was extruded." (Ogden, 1979, p357) that is particularly interesting and I will be referring back to this and drawing out the object relations parallels to the dualistic thinking process throughout the rest of this paper.

  
  
  

  1.3. Proposed syntheses of these dualities.

  Of course awareness of and sensitivity to dualisms is not new in the field of Personology, researchers have been aware that these distinctions were largely for pedagogical purposes and that they don't exist in reality and many attempts have been made to synthesize them.

  For instance, Millon attempted to remedy the nature/nurture duality by proposing that biological and experiential determinants combine and interact in a reciprocal interplay throughout life." (p492). He proposed a " Biosocial learning approach" which saw an individual as having a certain set of chromosomes/constitutional pattern which shapes and interacts with their social reinforcement experiences.

  Similarly, in his Social Identity theory, Tajfel attempted to synthesize the dichotomy of "Self-Other" by formulating a continuum of behaviour on the one end of which is purely interpersonal or interindividual behaviour that occurs when the social interaction between two or more people is determined solely by their unique characteristics, while at the other extreme placing purely intergroup behaviour which occurs when the interaction is wholly determined by the participants membership in various groups. (Foster et al, 1993)

  Merleau-Ponty challenged the mutual exclusivity of traditional "Self-Other" dichotomies as well as challenging " ..the classical dichotomy between a fully determinate and an impartial observor." (Langer, 1989, p17) by putting forward an argument of co-constitutionality: that it is via the world that the very meaning of the person's existence emerges both for himself and for others" and it is through each person's existence that his/her world is given meaning.

  This relates to Plumwood's concerns as regards the link between the maintenance of self/other thinking and its relationship with rationality and instrumentalism mentioned earlier, as well as the arguments proposed by environmental psychologists.

  Other researchers, like the late Timothy Leary, in arguing that personology should focus less on the self and more on the interpersonal, propose that diagnosis and categorisation should deal less with what one person is and more with what a person does, overtly or covertly, in relation to another person who, in some sense is the object of this behaviour.

  It is in terms of such interpersonally-interpreted standard diagnostic labels that bioenergeticist Alexander Lowen classifies his set of 5 character types (oral, psychopathic, masochistic, schizoid, rigid) that are going to form the focus of the experimental aspect of this project which will be discussed later in this paper. Before going on to that let us deal with one more duality in Personology.

  
  
  

  2. THE MIND-body DUALITY

  Another duality that one comes across in Personology is the mind-body duality. Similar to the gender issue mentioned earlier this duality could also be considered a "dichotomy" in terms of the argument that the body is merely a negative characterisation of the mind, containing all its opposites: unconscious, mortal, bestial, primitive etc.

  
  
  

  2.1 A brief history.

  In the earliest Greek thought there was no attempt to draw a distinction between mind and body, nor therefore was there an attempt to describe the relationship between mind and body. It was Plato who later introduced the idea that mind and body are two separate entities: immortal soul and mortal body. Aristotle disagreed arguing that mind and body could not be divided and that body is mind made manifest. Later, the Middle Ages notion that "form followed matter" (as it were) suggested that soul was dependent on matter. This was too much for the rigorous religious climate of the time and led to Aquinas arguing for the readoption of Plato's differentiation between the two. During the Renaissance the dichotomy between mind and body widened and in the Enlightenment with the dualistic model of mind and body proposed by Descartes it was firmly entrenched. This facilitated the objectification of the body and the discounting of the subject's bodily experience.

  This Cartesian mind/body framework, argues Johnson (1987) creates two splits in human experience:

  (1.) In arguing that the body does not play a crucial role in understanding, in spite of the fact that rationality makes use of material presented by the senses, it facilitates an ontological gap between mind and body, reason and sensation.

  (2.) In arguing that the mind knows its own representations and their relations it facilitates an epistemological gap between our internal ideas and the external reality.

  
  
  

  2.1. Somatophobia.

  There are many traditional belief systems supporting this split between mind and body. Several feminist writers have identified within Western traditions a deep fear and hatred ("somatophobia") of the body.

  "...what is most despised in these cultural traditions are precisely those functions that we share with animals, the 'animality' of our bodies as they sweat, bleed or defecate" ( Spelman, 1982, in Birke, 1994, p 115).

  This would be supported by the Judeo-Christian tradition, for example, which asserts that humans are set apart from animals in terms of their "divine spark of rationality" (Johnson, 1987, pxxvi) that it is by their rationality (mind) that humans transcend their physical embodiment and approximate godliness.

  It would seem as if scientific method with its bias towards mechanism, constancy and reductionism as well as various social taboos and morals around sexuality and bodily functions are both consequences and perpetrators of this "somatophobia".

  
  
  

  2.1.1. Scientism

  In the history of research the body gradually became the container of the active processes under scrutiny and this effectively reified the body.

  "The body of the anatomists was (and is) an objectified entity, a neutral, passive and sometimes dead lump of material to be dissected and analyzed. When we speak today of 'the body' it is to this generalized entity, abstracted from any particular personality that we usually refer. " (Radley, 1991, p33)

  And the dominant medical model, until recently based on the Cartesian mind-body duality, "regards dysfunction or disease as the result of aetiological factors which are typically biological in nature, so that treatment is construed as a biological process wherein psychological and environmental factors are not always considered.." (Sclebusch, p8).

  
  
  

  2.1.2 Morality.

  Since the Enlightenment and its emphasis on the moral dignity proper to every individual, there has been an effort by society to dissassociate itself from desire and mortality. (Dent,1992).

  Once again, viewed from an object relations perspective, one needs to bear in mind that the process outlined here is one of splitting, disowning and reclaiming remembering the arguments that dualisms allow for a denying of connections thereby creating an ontological gap between reason and sensation, an epistemological gap between internal ideas and external reality and facilitating rationality and instrumentalism.

  Having separated the mind from body, the detached body is used as an object of perception, it is projected and reclaimed in an area in which it is used extensively, in stereotyping : in predicting the private interior by the public exterior.

  
  
  

  2.2 Stereotyping.

  2.2.1. body Stereotyping and the Self.

  Hagglund and Piha (1980) argue that an awareness of one's body as a separate object is the very foundation of the formation of the self, that as we categorise others according to their bodies so we categorise ourselves.

  In terms of how the formation of self is a social process Birke (1994) refers to the fact that the coding of bodies is a cultural one, arguing that bodies are not just bodies but male and female ones with all the meanings that that entails and that even body parts are culturally coded, certain bodily features being associated more with one social category and its discrimanatory implications than another: eg hips, biceps, nose, wrinkles, chin.

  Radley (1991) refers to the study of how people look at each other and their consequent deductions as "person perception". He highlights how the interpretation of the data of "person perception" has changed over the years with changing social attitudes towards the body and social groups.

  Once again it is necessary to highlight the detachment with which this process is undertaken as Radley (1991) points out: " This was not the living body, as much as the physical body seen and objectified through the comparisons its owner might make with the physical characteristics of other people." (p64)

  
  
  

  2.2.2 body Stereotyping and the Other.

  Gilman argues that the "Other" is characterized in terms of physical appearance "be they sick, mad, sexually profligate, or black...They can have their qualities condensed in their facial expression and in their deportment." (Gilman, in Radley, 1991, p55). Thus we see the so-called "primitive" other photographed naked in the National Geographic, as we see the "female" other draped half-naked over a new car in an advert.

  Mindful of the injustices perpetrated by body categorising, the scepticism and sensitivity around body categorisation is more understandable. When the body is ignored in research, however, it is often unclear whether this is to avoid indiscriminate and simplistic body stereotyping as evidenced in Apartheid, Eugenics, The Holocaust, sexism etc in which it may provide a pseudo-scientific retreat for bigots and racists, or whether this is a function of "somatophobia". I suppose, in object relation terms, one could say that it is unclear whether the person is participating in the process at the splitting stage (somatophobia) process or the projective identification stage (prejudice).

  
  
  

  2.3.Proposed syntheses.

  The history of Psychological research includes much debate as to the relationship between mind and body. The importance of the body was acknowledged by many important researchers and theorists including Freud, Piaget, Winnicott.

  Work carried out by Sheldon in 1940 drew on the work of phrenologists and characterologists of the previous century and particularly on the work of Kretschmer who had categorised mentally ill patients in terms of their physique. By measuring various parts of the body and taking ratios of these measures Sheldon defined three components: ectomorphy, endomorphy, and mesomorphy which together provided the parameters for a range of body types.

  Winnicott (1958) argued that in fact the mind does not exist as an entity, but that it is a special case of functioning of the "psyche-soma", that the psyche can be said to be the "imaginative elaboration of somatic parts, feelings and functions, that is of physical aliveness" (p244, my italics) and that it is not localized anywhere.

  Merleau-Ponty's (1976, in Kelly 1986, p24) perspective expanded this argument to include both the self/other dichotomy and the "..dichotomy between a fully determinate and an impartial observor" (Langer, 1989, p17). He asserted that " In order to explore my body in the same way as any other perceptual object I would need another body, which itself would be unobservable."

  This highlights another aspect of the "embodied self": its private, interior component and its public, exterior component neither of which are wholly observable by another or by onesself, but which are constructed interpersonally.

  Most recently in 1995 a neuroscience researcher Damasio, in his book "Descartes' Error" argues that Descartes failed to see that "Nature appears to have built the apparatus of rationality not just on top of the apparatus of biological regulation, but also from it and with it." (in Dennett, 1995, p3). He argues that the older systems intertwine with the new in a way distributing the self throughout the body, that all images are rooted in neural representations that preserve the maps of sensory and bodily experience. That is to say that all thought is "grounded in these body-representing neural structures, and from this they gain the power to move us in ways that 'pure thought' could not." (in Dennett, 1995, p3).

  The so-called body Therapies emphasise the part played by the body in the genesis and resolution of psychological conflict, attempting to mend the mind-body split. One of these body therapies is bioenergetics.

  
  
  

  3. HISTORY OF BIOENERGETICS.

  Bioenergetics has its origins in the work of Wilhelm Reich, an enthusiastic protege of Freud. He was among the first of the psychoanalysts to adopt an holistic view of a person, refusing to divide the psyche from the soma or the individual from their culture and civilization. He was an active Marxist and anti-fascist and was especially noted for his work on character resistance (1933) and his ideas on the central role of the orgasm (1927).

  While Freud gradually abandoned his notion of the libido as an actual energetic phenomenon, Reich saw it as the essence of life and came to measure and call it first "bioenergy", then "vegetative energy" and finally the notorious "orgone energy".

  Reich, like Freud, argued that the basic problem in neuroses was to be found in defences associated with unresolved infantile conflicts. " These inhibitions block or distort the natural expression of real biological needs. In adult life, the inhibitions are retained out of irrational fear that asserting these instinctual impulses will result in intolerable pain or frustration. ( Saeger, in Cassius, 1980, p31).

  Eventually this focus on the form of the expression led Reich to recognize observable physical dynamics corresponding to specific psychic attitudes. He argued that psychic and somatic experiences are phenomenologically indistinguishable and mutually reinforcing unit. With this he began working on psychic attitudes through manipulation of tangible muscular tension.

  
  
  

  3.1.Lowen.

  Many subsequent bodytherapies are indebted to Reich's work and teaching, amongst them are Alexander Lowen's Bioenergetics whose character types were used in the experiment.

  Lowen, a qualified lawyer and doctor, studied with Reich, later developing his own bioenergetic formulations and exercises.

  Lowen highlights the individual's need to recognize their embodiment and outlines 5 character structures. A character is defined as the habitual pattern of behaviour (including defences) with which an individual handles this orientation towards pleasure, the primary drive according to bioenergetics.

  If pleasure is defined as being expansive, "opening up, reaching out, making contact. (Lowen, p138), lack of pleasure would be the reverse "closing off, withdrawing, holding in or holding back" (ibid, p138), this can lead to pain or anxiety which in turn necessitates the setting up of a defense against the impulse.(note how the dichotomy of pleasure/absence of pleasure becomes a dualism.)." Rigidity and a lack of spontaneity suggest that the energetic charge is not flowing freely into the muscular system. This picture adds up to a state of contraction in the organism which is the somatic aspect of pain." (p138)

  
  
  

  3.1.2. Lowen's Character types.

  Using this rationale Lowen extrapolates a set of five basic types, and "Each type has a special pattern of defense on both the psychological and the muscular levels that distinguishes it from other types" (Lowen, 1978, p151). The five types, categorised in terms of physical and psychological dimensions are "schizoid", "oral", "psychopathic", "masochistic" and "rigid".

  
  
  

  4. The Study.

  What the study did was to examine the social construction of this psychological and muscular match by asking subjects of different groups (gender, race, age, source) to match Lowen's description of each of the 5 character types with 5 of his figure drawings.

  It aimed to ascertain :

  i) whether there is a pattern in the way that the general public stereotypes individuals in terms if their bodies.

  ii) whether the link between body features and personality features suggested by Lowen is agreed with by the general public.

  iii) whether there are differences in the way that different group members categorise others in terms of their bodies.

  iv) whether the way in which people categorise themselves has an impact on how they categorise others.

  
  
  

  4.1 Subjects.

  40 subjects were chosen on the basis of availability, ostensibly 20 were to have been chosen from University population and 20 from Pietermaritzburg central, a male and female of representative of 4+1 race groups and age extremes. In practise although 40 subjects participated in the study the groups are not represented equally.

  
  
  

  4.2. Limitations.

  4.2.1 In terms of the body.

  i) The silhouette drawings used on the questionnaire are not easy to differentiate, more-lifelike drawings would seem more suitable.

  ii) A two dimensional figure drawing of any quality would seem not to do justice to a theory which deals with body energy and tension patterns.

  
  
  

  4.2.2. In terms of the personality characteristics.

  iii) It was necessary to condense more complex descriptions of character types into short paragraphs which, although evaluated by an independent judge, were too simplistic to be totally accurate.

  
  
  

  4.2.3. In terms of its treatment of social construction:

  iv) The results were drawn from too small, and too controlled a population to allow easy analysis and generalisability. Ideally the groups of subjects would have been more disparate: university students and rural subjects for example, unfortunately time and money constraints did not allow this.

  V) Lowen's constellation of body features and character features could not be challenged. This might be termed the "synecdoche-ic fallacy" where part agreement erroneously constituted whole agreement between body-type and character-type.

  
  
  

  4.3 Analysis.

  Using the chi squared test, cross tabulation, trend analysis, and the Anova

  
  
  

  4.4 Results.

  The results demonstrate no consensus with Lowen's proposal, although there was more agreement around Lowen's rigid character personality/body match than any of the other proposed matches. There seemed to be significant consensus around other matches between psychological and physical characters (Schizoid/oral; oral/schizoid and psychopathic/masochistic. The results were in no way group specific in terms of source, age, sex or race.

  
  
  

  5. Conclusion and Recommendations.

  This paper has attempted to show how dualistic thinking has accorded various perspectives and treatment procedures priority over others and has aimed to demonstrate how a critical awareness of the nature and repercussions of dualistic thinking might allow the clinician and researcher to adopt perspectives and intervention strategies which are more tolerant of integrative complexity.

  The paper looked at the historical origins of dualistic thinking and its implications by examining instances of dualisms in personology : nature/nurture, nurture/culture, self/other, mind/body. Various syntheses of these dualisms were also explored: the asserting of interpersonal dynamics by the likes of Leary, Tajfel and Millon, the deconstruction of the self/other dualism by Merleau-Ponty and environmental psychologists, the assertion of mind-body interpenetrative unity by Merleau-Ponty, Damasio and Bioenergeticists.

  As paradigms shift away from reductionistic, dualistic, modernism to a perspective which is more wholistic, pluralist, post-modern a bio/psycho/social model including an awareness of the body and its interaction with an individual's past experiences, belief systems and interpersonal dynamics might create a more complete picture of a person and facilitate a more effective approach to facilitating change in the individual.

  In terms of the latter, Keeney cites research by Bandler and Grinder (1979) which "....demonstrates that most clinicians (and their clients) habitually encounter the world without differentiating between their sensory experience and their created abstractions about that experience. The problem is that clinicians' higher order abstractions, rather than their more immediate sensory experience, often becomes the primary data of therapy." (Keeney, 1983, p45).

  In the light of such a statement one might propose that a primary focus on the body and on interpersonal behaviour, by both clinician and client, might remedy this, yielding relevant, useful and available information. This paper argues that a critical awareness and understanding of the processes and implications of the dualistic thinking permeating both these areas of investigation would integrate the dualism which Keeney sets up between immediate sensory experience and higher order abstractions. This might challenge the dualistic framework in which data is often embedded and facilitate a more integrated approach to seeking more integrated data.

  
  
  
  
  

  References

  
  
  

  Bateson, M. (1991). Our Own metaphor. Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution Press.

  Baron, J. (1988). Thinking and Deciding. New York: Cambridge, University Press.

  Billig, M. (1976). Social Psychology and Intergroup relations. London: Academic Press.

  Birke, L. (1994). Feminism, Animals and Science. Buckingham: Open University Press.

  Bless,C. & Achola,P. (1990). Fundamentals of Social Research Methods. Lusaka: Government Printer.

  Cassius, J. (1975). bodyscripts. Tennessee: Study edition.

  Cassius, J. (1980). Horizons in Bioenergetics. Tennessee: Promethean Publications.

  Chaplin, J.P. (1975). Dictionary of Psychology. New York: Laurel.

  Cheng, C. (1975). The Mind-body Equation Revisited. Philosophical Aspects of the Mind-body Problem.

  Dennett, D. (1995). Our Vegetative Soul: The search for a reliable model of the human self. The Times Literary Supplement. August 25, 1995, no.4821.

  Dent, N. (1992). A Rousseau dictionary. Cambridge: Blackwell.

  Foster, D. Et al (eds). (1991). Social Psychology in South Africa. Johannesburg: Lexicon.

  Fouche, F. (1992). A Critique of Androgyny. South African Journal of Philosophy. 11 (4). 91-95.

  Hagglund, T. & Piha, H. (1980). The Inner Space of the body Image. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, XLIX, 256-283.

  Johnson, M. (1987).The body in the Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

  Jordaan, J. & Jordaan, W.(1989). Man in Context. Johannesburg: Lexicon.

  Keeney, B. (1983). Aesthetics of Change. The Guilford Press: New York.

  Kelly, K.J.(1986). The body in Psychotherapy. U.N.P: Thesis.

  Kepner, J. (1987). body Processes: A Gestalt Approach to working with the body in Psychotherapy. New York: Gestalt Institute of Cleveland Press.

  Keith-Spiegel, P. (1985). Ethics in Psychology: Professional standards and cases. New York: Random House.

  Kolb, B. & Wishaw, I. (1990). Fundamentals of Human Neuropsychology. New York: Freeman & co.

  Langer, M.(1989). Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception. Cape Town: Juta.

  Leach, E. (1978). Lévi-Strauss. London: Fontana Collins

  Lowen, A. (1978). Bioenergetics. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

  MacCormack,C. & Strathern, M. (eds.). (1980). Nature, Culture and Gender. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  Maddi, S. (1976). Personality Theories: a comparitive analysis. Homewood: Dorsey.

  McLemore, C. & Smith Benjamin, L. (1979). What happened to Interpersonal Diagnosis. American Psychologist, vol 34, no 1, 17-34.

  Meyer, Moore & Viljoen. (1989). Personality Theories from Freud to Frankl. Johannesburg: Lexicon.

  Millon, T. (ed) (1969). A Biosocial-Learning Approach. Hansbook of Clinical Health Psychology. New York: Plenum Press.

  Ogden, T. (1979). On Projective Identification. International Journal of Psychoanalysis. 60, 357-373.

  Olson, D. & Astington, J. (1990). Talking about Text: How literacy contributes to thought. Journal of Pragmatics 14 705-721.

  Pervin, L.A. (1989). Goal Concepts in Personality and Social Personality. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

  Piaget, J. & Inhelder, B. (1969). The Psychology of the Child. New York: Basic Books.

  Radley, A. (1991).The body and Social Psychology. London: Springer-Verlag.

  Sacks & Sacks. (1981). Psychology of Running. Campaign Illinois: Human Kinetics.

  Sampson, E. (1988). The Debate on Individualism: Indigenous Psychologies of the Individual and Their Role in Personal and Societal Functioning. American Psychologist. Vol 43, no.1. 15-22.

  Schlebusch, L. (ed) (1990). An Overview of bridging the mind-body dichotomy within the health care system in Clinical Health Psychology: A Behavioural Medicine Perspective. Johannesburg: Southern Press.

  Shotter, J.(1984). Social Accountability and Selfhood. London: Basil Blackwell.

  Valle, R.S. & King, M. (1978). Existential-Phenomenological alternatives for Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press.

  Wells, B. (1983). body and Personality. New York: Longman.

  Widiger, T.& Frances, A. (1985). The DSM-III Personality Disorders. Archives of General Psychiatry-vol 42, 614-623.

  Winnicott, D.W. (1958). Mind and its relation to the Psyche-Soma. Collected Papers. London: Tavistock.

  
  
  

  [email protected]

  Department of Psychology

  University of Natal (PMB)

  
  
  
  
  

  INSPECTING THE body OF THE "GENERAL INDIVIDUAL": TOWARDS A CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY OF HUMAN PERSONALITY

  
  
  

  Kenneth G. Wilson

  Department of Psychology, University of the Witwatersrand

  
  
  

  The aim of this paper is to investigate the possible nature of a critical social theory of human personality. This exercise is regarded as being important as a result of the paradoxical status of the term "personality": personality being one of the "core" areas of the study of psychology, whilst at the same time, there being little agreement as to that which is signified by the term. The central difficulty in defining personality adequately is the ubiquitous nature of the notion of the "general individual". The apparent difficulties in the utilization and definition of "personality" are related to the so-called "crisis in social psychology". It is argued that the uncritical acceptance of the notion of the "general individual" is what put social psychology into crisis in the first place, whilst at the same time functioning as a barrier to the development of more adequate understandings of human personality. A critical social theory of personality is then proposed as a possible solution to some of the outlined theoretical problems, and is largely derived from the domains of social psychology, personality theory, the philosophy of science and critical theory. The paper describes the central features of such a theory, and ends with a discussion of some possible applications.

  
  
  

  [email protected]

  Department of Psychology

  University of the Witwatersrand

  PO Wits

  2050

  ---

  2nd Annual Qualitative Methods Conference: "The Body Politic"
  critical methods society - www.criticalmethods.org - [email protected]