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Researcher/activist engagements with AIDS Policy-making After the Death of objectivity
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Writing about the history of AIDS policy-making for the last two years while simultaneously reading Foucault has been a very strange experience. On the one hand the motivation for my research stems from my role as an AIDS activist fighting for a certain normative vision of society which I demonstrate for on the streets, on the other reading convincing arguments that rights-based discourse and the normative content of modernity is part of the oppressive and tainted modern power/knowledge regime. I have been exploiting, as a researcher, the tensions between Foucault’s conceptualisation of modern power as oppressive and knowledge as its handmaiden; whilst at the same time understanding the legacy of modern power/knowledge as also giving us the rights-based discourse that has proven so potent in struggles for socio-economic justice, including the struggle for access to HIV treatment in South Africa. 
The fundamental dilemma I wish to address, but not conclusively answer is how should researchers concerned with a vision of social justice, but at the same time convinced by what I will term ‘the death of Objectivity’ in the wake of post-structuralism and post-modernism, frame their involvement in civil society. Living in such times as we do when progressive activists demonstrating against the agenda of the World Summit on Sustainable Development are being locked up and investigated by the state, is not the very discursive space in which we can operate becoming smaller and more circumscribed by state power? We live in times when poverty is commonly defined by the arbitrary positivistic measure of living on less than a dollar a day;i times when economic ‘realism’ and ‘truth’ mean that intellectual property rights come before the lives of people living with HIV/AIDS, that people are cut off from basic services for the crime of being unable to afford them; times when UNICEF’s solution to childhood malnutrition in poor countries is people eating McDonald’s burgers in rich countries.ii Maybe the failure of positivism and objectivity is more a political failure than a failure of meaning; and maybe there are insights that a Foucauldian model of knowledge and power can give progressive civil society and researchers about the practice of resistance to the ideology that ‘there is no alternative’. At the same time, we should see the rights-based discourse that many of us use to push for socio-economic ‘second generation rights’ as a political strategy not grounded in some sort of a priori truth, but as a useful and contingent strategy to push for certain normative visions of how society ought to be. 
At the same time, in the relatively new discipline of civil society studies thinkers such as L. David Brown have encouraged the engagement of academics looking at the sector with civil society activism in a ‘vision/values framework’, as a part of participatory methodology (David Brown, 2001). Brown has spoken about the ideal relationship between activists and researchers in civil society studies as researchers and activists as having a close working relationship, with activists being involved in research and researchers being involved in activism, in other words for a blurring of roles. 
Perhaps also an end to attempts to prove objectivity on the part of researchers will allow them to more openly show what their norms and preferences are; for a more honest understanding of the political uses to which the knowledge we produce can be put and what the political motivations behind it are. Is this not possibly the best response to the ‘objective’ and ‘rational’ ‘cookie-cutter’/’one size fits all’ pretensions of neoliberal logic. I.The ‘Death of Objectivity’ and modernity in tatters: Foucault on modern power/knowledge
Before looking at the conversation between Foucault and Habermas’s thoughts about ‘the modern knowledge project’, perhaps we can pause a little and reflect on the stark shift in the humanities away from notions of knowledge produced in the academe as ‘objectively’ and ‘rationally’ true. Since the ground-breaking work of thinkers like Foucault and Derrida there has been a systematic attempt by many thinkers in the West to rethink the hierarchies, claims and understanding of academic writing itself in the Western intellectual tradition. Norvick when speaking about this big transition in History as a discipline and its claims in the last thirty years has characterised it as a case of ‘objectivity in crisis (1988:415); As Norvick has said. <blockquote dir="ltr" style="MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
"From the 1960s onwards…In one field after another distinctions between fact and value and between theory and observation were called into question. For many, postures of distinterestedness and neutrality increasingly appeared as outmoded and illusory. It ceased to be axiomatic that the scholar’s or scientists’ task was to represent accurately what was "out there". Most crucially and across the board, the notion of a determinate and unitary truth about the physical or social world…came to be seen by a growing number of scholars as illusory" (Norvick, 1988:523). </blockquote>
In the wake of the postmodern/poststructural assault, the only tatter of objectivity that really remains is a generally agreed on set of ethical methodological standards which most professional academic historians agree on.iii
Whilst aware of this broader challenge to objectivity in the human sciences, I’m only going to focus on the influence of Foucault on my own thought. In particular, in Foucault’s notion of a genealogy articulated in such works as "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" and Archeology/Knowledge smashed the search for origins and the notion of a firm faith in metaphysics and essences: Foucault advocated for a genealogical history that "refuses the certainty of absolutes" and evades metaphysics as opposed to "The historians history [which] finds its support outside of time and pretends to base its judgements on apocalyptic objectivity" (Foucault, 1977:152). 
Putting his rejection of objectivity aside for a moment, Foucault has often been criticised for not allowing political agency and resistance in his account of modern power. Chief amongst Foucault’s critics has been Jürgen Habermas. Habermas in his work The Philosophic Discourse of Modernity argued that modernity should not be left unscathed by critiques of it; yet at the same time that ideas within modernity itself such as reason, justice and truth can be used to criticise the humanist traditions that the West has inherited (1987: 181-182). 
Habermas characterises postmodernism, a rubric under which he places Foucualt’s work, as aiming to <blockquote dir="ltr" style="MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
Pull [the] veil of reason from the sheer will to power [postmodernism] At the same time is supposed to shake the iron cage in which the Spirit of modernity has been objectified in the current form (Habermas, 1987:4).</blockquote>
He is deeply critical of the whole postmodern/poststructural project of undermining the metaphysical/normative content of modernity, as attempts to undermine modernity with ‘language games’, rather than trying to reveal the humanistic self-understanding of modernity and its normative content (notions of citizenship, human rights, autonomy and rationality) (Habermas, 1987: 282-283). 
Operating in the context of contemporary South Africa what can be said in defence of Foucault as a meaningful platform for civil society action? Are his ideas merely elitist language games with no relation to contemporary reality? 
Foucault argued in his article "Politics and the study of discourse", that a progressive politics could not be based on the ‘primitive’ foundation of "transcendental teleology" of post- nineteenth century philosophy; that it could not be based on the hierarchies and dichotomies so comfortable to many thinkers operating in a post-Enlightenment mode (1991:62, 65). Foucault criticises in the same interview a politics, which sees only "…an epiphany of triumphant reason, or deciphering in it only a historico-transcendent destiny of the West" (Foucault, 1991:69). This image of the history of modernity Foucault critiques here, a rising amount of rationality, truth, humaneness and progress speaks to the kind of Whiggish nationalistic histories so prevalent in South African government speeches today.iv The kind of discourse in which democracy human rights and so on were fought for and definitively won in the struggle against apartheid and now ‘all is well’ in the rainbow nation. 
To turn to Foucault’s concept of the functioning of modern power itself, he conceived of it as productive as opposed to prohibitive: an idea strongly developed in The Introduction to the History of Sexuality (1976: 10-12; 17-18; 33-35). Power was for Foucault found in a multiplicity of "micropractices" of the power/knowledge regime, a crucial part of its functioning was with a type of unidirectional visibility making individuals operate self-surveillance (as developed in both Discipline and Punish and History of Sexuality (1977:27-30; 1976:20-23). 
Perhaps, in the light of the recent repression against some civil society groupings at the WSSD, Foucault’s concept of disciplinary power is more valid now than we would like. Historically, I have certainly found evidence in my research for my Honours thesis that late apartheid state practices aimed to exercise power over the ‘docile and useful’ bodies of AIDS patients and that the public health aim of surveillance and ‘containment’ of the epidemic in the early 1980s set to stigmatise erotic minorities and inscribe power on patients’ bodies. (Mbali, 2001: 18-20).v This ‘containing’ and ‘surveilling’ early response to AIDS was linked to coercive and neo-Malthusian family planning discourse around population control (Mbali, 2001: 35-41). 
Reading the Durban Medical Officer of Health reports from 1985-1994, articles on AIDS policy in the South African Medical Journal and documents from the Family Planning Association of South Africa archives, I found that precisely a Foucauldian understanding of medicine and public as part of the exercise of disciplinary power over AIDS patients. The idea in the 1980s, according to such a discourse, was to keep the ‘ promiscuous disease carriers’ (inevitably understood as white gay men, black prostitutes or white people having sex with Africans) away from the ‘normal’ non-promiscuous population (Mbali, 2001:18-19). In Durban municipal health reports HIV infection statistics were disaggregated by race, which along with the city’s racialised boundaries, was written on to patient’s bodies (Mbali, 2001: 26). According to Jana Sawacki in a Foucaldian understanding of sexuality we should think about it in terms of populations, neighbourhoods, settlement patterns migration urban conflict and epidemiology to understand what social forces regulate stigmatised erotic populations (1988:185). My research on the history of AIDS policy-making has lead me to analyse Foucault’s work on the techniques of government and nature of modern power. Should we think of modern power as exercised by doctors, statisticians, bureaucrats, government officials in AIDS policy-making as an iron cage, or as a malleable, changing thing, the weaknesses of which civil society can exploit? II.Foucault on Civil Society and the Art of "delicate, economic and modest" Governmentality
However, if modern power was an iron cage, the question I then had to ask as a historian was how does one account for the strength of civil society resistance to this containing, discriminatory discourse around AIDS within a Foucauldian framework of understanding power. Foucault seems to talk about subjects of modern power more than citizens exercising their rights in the Habermasian sense. As Patten has said "Foucault’s conception of the subject does not provide a basis on which to understand the inevitability of resistance to domination" (Patten, 1994 cited in Ashenden and Owen, 1999: 14).
In South Africa and internationally I discovered strong and vocal resistance in the civil society and public health discourse, by the 1990s, to this stigmatising and discriminatory discourse around AIDS ‘victims’, which I found to be so accurately described by Foucault’s theories. Medical researchers, statisticians and the Durban municipal health machinery began realising the seriousness of the epidemic: that it was no longer just black prostitutes and white ‘homosexuals’ at risk but also the general heterosexual population (Mbali, 2001:50-51). Hospitals such as Baragwanath hospital began organising training programmes for their staff on how not to stigmatise and isolate patients (Mbali, 2001: 54). More in depth social studies around AIDS began appearing including ones showing the gendered aspects of AIDS (Mbali, 2001:58-59). 
Even as early as the 1980s left-wing and feminist anti-apartheid academics and activists were arguing that the socio-economic inequalities of apartheid was the true engine for ill health in South Africa (Mbali, 2001: 42-47). Jonathan Mann’s assertion of the need for AIDS policy-making to be right-based and non-discriminatory lead both in South Africa and globally to an international shift towards rights-based approaches in AIDS policy-making (Mbali, 2001:78). 
To shift from back to the broader theoretical arguments about civil society, what about the concept of the citizen and civil society itself as associated with individualism, the rule of the law and markets? What of Marxist critiques of civil society as the realm of individual egoism and self- interest, of civil society as ‘bourgeois society’ (Ashenden, 1999: 143, 146)? The idea of limiting the power of the state and protecting the rights of the individual can also be traced back to the ideas around the right to own private property (Dembour, 1996:24-25). Does civil society really have the capacity to develop a "critical public sphere capable of generating resistance to unaccountable expert authority and administrative power" as Habermas understands it? (Ashenden, 1999:146; Habermas, 1996: 358-369). 
Ashenden’s account of Foucault’s understanding of civil society and the culture of governance links it to his concept of ‘governmentality’, which is used to explain the rise of liberal political rationalities (Ashenden, 1999:151). Foucault shows in his article "Governmentality" that the ‘governmentalisation’ state is a key process: he notes changes in the exercise of modern power such as the invention of statistics and the notion of population management, which go along with the creation of institutions, procedures, analyses, tactics, which allow a specifically new exercise of modern disciplinary power (Foucault, 1991: 102). The modern subject as a member of a population is a subject of normalisation and rationality (Ashenden 1999:152; Foucault 1991:95,103). The only political issues after the rise of governmentality are, for Foucault, the problems of governmentality and the techniques of the state, in a modern state where sovereignty, discipline and government are simultaneously enforced over the population through the apparatus of security (1991:102-103). 
The political tradition of liberalism, out of which rights-based discourse stems, with its notions of individual liberty the art of self-limiting government becomes a technique of governmentality in Foucault’s account, according to Burchell (1991:141, 143). Foucault’s basic scepticism about rights based discourse and an independent, oppositional civil society (concepts dear to Habermas) stems from his notion of capilliary power: as Burchell has said for Foucault "models of social and political identity…must at the same time address the question not only of how we are governed by others, but also of how we ourselves are to be involved in the practices of governing others" (Burchell, 1991: 145). 
Barry, Osbourne and Rose characterise Foucault as arguing in "Governmentality’ that liberalism and the creation of civil society arising from Foucault’s concept of ‘governmentality’ should be understood not as less government, or necessarily always in opposition, or limiting the powers of government, but as "the continual injunction that rulers should govern cautiously, delicately, economically, modestly" (Butler, Osbourne and Rose, 1996:8). The separation of state and civil society and a new concern with society in the nineteenth century is then seen by Barry, Osborne and Rose’s account of Foucault’s work as not a withdrawal of government but a new kind of problematisation of government (1996:9). III.Habermas’s Defence: Or is Human Rights Another (Useful and Important) Myth of Modernity?
But the question then becomes whether Foucault’s account of the evolution of civil society and rights-based discourse in a liberal rubric really speaks to South African civil society either historically or today, especially in its attempts to realise rights enshrined in the South African constitution? The Treatment Action Campaign, an organisation to which I belong, frequently speaks about access to treatment in terms of "the right to access to healthcare", the "right to life" and so on. 
Habermas’s understanding of civil society as constituting and protecting the public sphere and rights –based discourse in Between Facts and Norms is a highly useful way of framing the character of progressive civil society in South Africa. To speak specifically to his linkages between civil society, the public sphere, and human rights, Habermas draws out the idea that communication in civil society sustains the public sphere itself and, simultaneously, the maintenance of this public sphere entails the ongoing defence by civil society of the right to freedoms of speech, expression and opinion (1996: 367, 369). Civil society both extends and radicalises existing rights through the public sphere and has the potential to transform itself (Habermas, 1996: 370, 372). Habermas’s basic problems with Foucault’s critique of liberalism and governmentality comes from his understanding of the liberal public sphere as inherently universal and heavily influenced by civil society: as he has said:<blockquote dir="ltr" style="MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px">
The rights to unrestricted inclusion and equality built into the liberal public spheres prevent exclusion mechanisms of the Foucauldian type and ground a potential for self-transformation. In the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the universalist discourses of the bourgeois public sphere could not longer immunise themselves from critique from within. The labour movement and feminism, for example were able to join these discourses in order to shatter the structures that had constituted them as ‘the other’ of a bourgeois public sphere (Habermas, 1996: 374). </blockquote>
It is true that many civil society organisations exploit the shortfall between the normative aims of post-Enlightenment rights-based discourse and the reality of oppression. 
Is it possible to argue that we are simultaneously citizens with rights and subjects of normalisation and disciplinary power of janus faced post-Enlightenment thought? What if both Habermas and Foucault’s accounts of modern civil society and rights-based discourse have a descriptive quality in modern day South Africa?
Or is rights-based discourse a ‘myth of modernity’ with less to fall back on than we may have thought? What is in a Derridean sense the law is part of the myth of modernity, as Peter Fitzpatrick has argued (1992:2, 10, 12). What if the law is part of modernity, which he characterises as ‘the West’s mythology against myth’? Fitzpatrick has argued that "Myth is the mute ground which enables ‘us’ to have a unified law and which brings together law’s contradictory existences into a patterned coherence" (Fitzpatrick, 1992:2). 
But why care if human rights, as a part of the law, can be characterised as a myth of modernity? If it is a myth it is certainly a powerful one, which has historically changed government actions, and shaped how people organise themselves into groups. Maybe a more productive way of thinking about rights-based discourse is to conceive of it as a useful political strategy to articulate normative claims for civil society at particular social and historical moments such as in contemporary post-apartheid South Africa.
Marie Bénédicte Dembour writing on the relationship of anthropologists to human rights discourse has argued that human rights have a fundamentally normative nature: they are often referring more to moral rights, things that have not yet found their way into legally binding provisions but we hope will (1996:29, 32). Human rights are fundamentally socially constructed, for Dembour, and are predominantly extralegal, corresponding less with actual ‘natural’ or ‘moral’ rights but more serving to articulate political claims in a particular social context (1996:33). People in favour of human rights therefore essentialise as a political strategy in order to give them an incontestable legimitacy: as she says "Political claims are at their best when they are essentialised. It is then that they appear unchallengable, that they can hope to receive a legitimacy which is not contestable" (Dembour, 1996:35).
Which brings us back to the issue of what strategies researchers with a post-modern Foucauldian suspicion of the normative claims of modernity, but with a strong normative sense of how society ‘ought’ to be can adopt. We can look at political articulations of our values in terms of a rights-based discourse although strategically phrased in terms that make it appear as if it is irrefutable, as a historically, socially and politically contingent strategy/tactic appropriate to the times we live in, in South Africa. As the Treatment Action Campaign has shown, framing political demands in terms of the constitution is a powerful tactic in the light of unethical exercise of state power. 
 IV.
Civil Society Studies and Researcher/Activists and Activist/Researchers
L. David Brown a thinker on methodologies of the new discipline of civil society studies has argued that civil society practitioners and researchers focussing on civil society ought to be brought together under the rubric of what he terms ‘Practice Research Engagement’, a methodology bringing together "reflective practitioners" and "action orientated researchers" (David Brown, 2001: 2). A methodology which he links to Freire’s ideas on participatory methodology and the proliferation in many disciplines of ‘action research' and ‘participatory methodology' (David Brown, 2001: 35). 
He has called for contact between "activist scholars" and "reflective activists" showing that there are fruitful links that can be established between both groupings (David Brown, 2001:9). I gain insights into AIDS policy-making both from spending days in the archives and holding workshops with other AIDS activists. At protests I hear new information, new perspectives from a range of social actors. I choose my research questions on the basis of unanswered questions I have as an activist. My role as a researcher has also allowed me to make important inputs into public debate around AIDS policy, especially in my arguments around understanding Mbeki’s denialism in historical context.
Being myself both an activist and a researcher I have found that both aspects of my life and work have overlapped very heavily. There are insights into my voluntary work around AIDS policy advocacy and my research into the history of such advocacy that I have found very fruitful. 
At the same time, I would argue that an engagement with Foucault’s ideas in graduate seminars and papers has influenced me to better understand the politics surrounding my own knowledge acquisition, and how I apply my knowledge for political purposes. Recognising the fact that my own research work isn’t necessarily ‘objectively’ and rationally true, but a particular reading of archives, has not really inhibited my work in a national movement forcefully articulating rights-based discourse as a strategy to realise particular normative claims that fit with my own value system. The two seem to co-exist even if sometimes somewhat intellectually uneasily in the fabric of my life. There seems to be rich economies of meaning, knowledge and motivation between my different roles as an activist and as a researcher. Conclusions
Perhaps then the death of objectivity is less to be mourned than celebrated. If activists using rights-based discourse understand it as a philosophically flawed and historically contingent strategy, perhaps it will allow for more strategic flexibility in present and future activism. Freed from the shackles of ‘objective truth and reality’ we can write in our offices and shout in the streets about the constructedness and contingency of the positivist notions of neoliberal economic ‘realists’. On the other hand, if academics using rights based discourse can understand the political power of presenting rights-based discourse as if it is irrefutably true, maybe researcher/activists will feel in less of a theoretical and normative dilemma. In the final analysis, as we use the language of liberalism and human rights, let us hear Foucault’s warning of us that the invention of civil society and liberalism came about as a technique of government, and an instrument of power. On the other hand, we should hear Habermas on the need for civil society to defend an independent public sphere and normative value-based visions of society based on rights. In the wake of demonstrations at the WSSD by social movements for the right to peaceful protest and in favour of fulfilment of rights such as the ‘right to water’ and the ‘right of access to healthcare’, perhaps we can see through the teargas and media coverage that we are simultaneously citizens with rights and subjects of normalisation.
Notes
i. I am yet again referring to media reports, but more commonly this arbitrary measure which bears no relation to the actual amount of money it takes to survive in poor countries heavily under-estimates the global extent of poverty. For an instance of a media report utilising this measure mindlessly see: Basildon Peta. "Taking aim at poverty from the glitz of Sandton". The Sunday Independent. (Johannesburg: www.iol.co.za, August 24 2002).
ii.I am referring here to media reports that as part of a Public, Private Partnership, McDonald’s will donate money to UNICEF for every burger eaten, what I consider an example of over-consumption and inequality deluxe. See: Paul Brown. "Summit row over big business plans". The Guardian. (London: www.guardian.co.uk, August 27th 2002).
iii. For instance the trial of holocaust denier David Irving was followed closely by many historians, who generally agreed that the outcome of the trial showed that it is unethical and unprofessional to fabricate or grossly misinterpret archives to fit one’s political perspective as Irving did. This shows that at least methodological rigorousness is still widely respected as important in the discipline of history.
iv. By a ‘Whiggish’ history I am referring to a teleological understanding of history which looks at historical actors in terms of whether they advanced of retarded the ‘progress’ of society towards liberalism and democracy. See Norvick (1988: 465) for more on this.
v. In my thesis I also cite Foucault’s Birth of the Clinic and Jana Sawacki’s work on "Foucault and Feminism". Bibliography
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 </www.iol.co.za></www.nu.ac.za></www.guardian.co.uk>

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